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AGAINST THE PEACE AND DIGNITY OF THE
STATE: SPOUSAL VIOLENCE AND
SPOUSAL PRIVILEGE
MALINDA L. SEYMOREt
I cannot remember all the times he hit me.
I might could count black eyes,
how many times I said I ran into doors
or fell down or stepped in the path
of any flying object except his fist.
Once I got a black eye playing softball.
The rest were him. Seven, eight.
I can name what of me he broke:
my nose, my arm, and four ribs
in the course of six years' marriage.
The ribs were after I said divorce
and in spite of a peace bond.
I spent the night in the hospital.
He did not even spend a night in jail.
The sheriff I helped elect does not
apply the law to family business.1
Every indictment in Texas ends with the phrase, "[a]gainst the
peace and dignity of the State."2 This phrase is in recognition of the
fact that crimes are not purely personal matters between a defendant
and a victim, but are offenses against society as a whole. By enacting
changes to its spousal privilege statute, Texas has an opportunity to
demonstrate that domestic violence offends the peace and dignity of
the state.
As is true in the rest of the country, family violence has reached
epidemic proportions in Texas. According to the Texas Department
of Human Services, 639,712 Texas women were physically abused by
their male intimate partners in 1992. 3 For more than 100,000 women,
this abuse occurred at least once a week.4 The fact that police are
t Associate Professor of Law, Texas Wesleyan University School of Law; J.D.,
1986, cum laude, Baylor University School of Law; B.A., 1982, Rice University.
1. Jo CARSON, All the times he hit me, in STORIES I AIN'T TOLD NOBODY YET 52
(Theatre Communications Group 1991).
2. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 21.02 (West 1989).
3. TEX. DEP'T HUM. SERVS., 1992 ANNUAL REPORT 67 (1992).
4. Id. The Texas data matches national estimates of the pervasiveness of spousal
violence. "Every eighteen seconds, a woman is beaten in the United States and be-
tween 2,000 and 4,000 women die every year because of this abuse." Gretchen P.
Mullins, The Battered Woman and Homelessness, 2 J.L. & POL'Y 237, 241 (1994) (cit-
ing Developments in the Law: Legal Responses to Domestic Violence, 106 HARV. L.
REV. 1498, 1501 (1993) and Sylvia A. Law, Every 18 Seconds a Woman is Beaten:
What Judges Can Do in the Face of this Carnage, 30 JUDGE'S J. 12, 14 (Winter 1991)).
Some authorities estimate incidents of domestic violence affect four million women
each year. Women and Violence: Hearings Before the Senate Committee on the Judici-
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reluctant to arrest domestic violence offenders 5 and that states are re-
luctant to prosecute such cases6 is well-documented. Prevalent socie-
tal attitudes diminishing the importance of spousal violence may help
explain this reluctance.7
In Texas, reluctance to pursue criminal sanctions against married
abusers is caused in part by the difficulty in procuring the battered
spouse's testimony.8 Although a victim spouse may testify voluntarily,
ary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 116-17 (1990) (testimony of Angela Browne, Ph.D.). The
FBI estimates one out of every two women in this country will be in an abusive rela-
tionship at some time in her life. Hearing on Domestic Violence Before the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1993) (statement of Sarah M.
Buel).
5. Carolyne R. Hathaway, Case Comment, Gender Based Discrimination in Po-
lice Reluctance to Respond to Domestic Assault Complaints, 75 GEO. L.J. 667 (1986);
Miriam H. Ruttenberg, A Feminist Critique of Mandatory Arrest: An Analysis of Race
and Gender in Domestic Violence Policy, 2 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 171 (1994); Sue
Ellen Schuerman, Note, Establishing a Tort Duty for Police Failure to Respond to
Domestic Violence, 34 ARIz. L. REV. 355 (1992); Developments in the Law: Legal
Responses to Domestic Violence, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1498 (1993) [hereinafter Legal
Responses to Domestic Violence]; Gary M. Bishop, Note, Section 1983 and Domestic
Violence: A Solution to the Problem of Police Officers' Inaction, 30 B.C. L. REV. 1357
(1989); Lauren L. McFarlane, Note, Domestic Violence Victims v. Municipalities: Who
Pays When the Police Will Not Respond?, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 929 (1991).
6. Angela Corsilles, Note, No-Drop Policies in the Prosecution of Domestic Vio-
lence Cases: Guarantee to Action or Dangerous Solution?, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 853
(1994); Elena Salzman, Note, The Quincy District Court Domestic Violence Prevention
Program: A Model Legal Framework for Domestic Violence Intervention, 74 B.U. L.
REV. 329 (1994); Lisa Memoli & Gina Plotino, Enforcement or Pretense: The Courts
and the Domestic Violence Act, 15 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 39 (1993); Legal Responses
to Domestic Violence, supra note 5; Chief Justice A.M. "Sandy" Keith, Domestic Vio-
lence and the Court System, 15 HAMLINE L. REV. 105 (1991); Jane W. Ellis,
Prosecutorial Discretion to Charge in Cases of Spousal Assault: A Dialogue, 75 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 56 (1984).
7. The findings of the Texas Gender Bias Task Force with regard to attitudes
about domestic violence are revealing:
More than half of female judges responding to the Judicial Attitudes Survey
reported that, in their opinions, law-enforcement personnel do not take fam-
ily violence seriously enough. Half of female respondents to the Attorney
Survey and more than a third of female judges said that the attitudes of law-
enforcement personnel discourage victim cooperation at least some of the
time.
More than a third of both male and female attorneys ... said that prosecu-
tors at least sometimes decline to prosecute domestic violence cases in crimi-
nal court, while a similar percentage of female attorneys and judges thought
that the attitudes of prosecutors discourage victim cooperation.
STATE BAR OF TEXAS, THE GENDER BIAS TASK FORCE OF TEXAS, FINAL REPORT 73
(Feb. 1994).
8. I recognize that much battering occurs in intimate relationships not sanctioned
by state-recognized marriages. However, the privilege does not apply to unmarried
couples, and a discussion of battering in these relationships is beyond the scope of this
article. For further information, see generally Sandra E. Lundy, Abuse That Dare Not
Speak Its Name: Assisting Victims of Lesbian and Gay Domestic Violence in Massa-
chusetts, 28 NEW ENG. L. REV. 273 (1993); Mac D. Hunter, J.S.C., Homosexuals as a
SPOUSAL PRIVILEGE
very few battered spouses actually do.9 Furthermore, Texas prosecu-
tors cannot compel a reluctant spouse's testimony because of the
spousal privilege statute. 10 However, effective September 1, 1995, the
Texas Legislature abolished the spousal privilege in cases where one
spouse is charged with a crime against the other." Today, in Texas, a
spouse can be compelled to testify in such cases. With this new
change, Texas joins the majority of states having a spousal crime ex-
ception to the marital privilege.
By amending the spousal privilege statute, the Texas Legislature
sends a message that spousal violence is a crime against the state that
society will not tolerate. As I discuss in a forthcoming article,12 rules
of evidence are more than simply neutral rules of procedure related to
courtroom control and trial tactics. Rules of evidence, including the
spousal privilege, illustrate the legal system's attitude toward women.
Jurisdictions which refuse to give a prosecutor the right to compel tes-
timony from spouses in domestic violence cases, as is possible in every
other crime, send an obvious message - when a man beats his wife, it
is not a crime which offends the state, it is simply a private matter
between two parties. 3 Even those jurisdictions with a spousal vio-
lence exception often leave married women unprotected by the legal
system because of very narrow and uninformed views of what consti-
tutes spousal violence.
With the adoption of this new spousal crime exception, Texas takes
an important step forward in fighting domestic violence. Giving pros-
ecutors the authority to compel a victim's testimony in domestic vio-
lence cases, and thus treating spousal battering crimes in a manner
consistent with other acts of violence, reinforces the principle that do-
New Class of Domestic Violence Subjects Under the New Jersey Prevention of Domes-
tic Violence Act of 1991, 31 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 557 (1992/1993).
9. See infra text accompanying notes 14-44 for a discussion of the dynamics of
domestic violence, which explains why battered wives are reluctant to testify.
10. TEX. R. CRIM. EvID. 504. A number of other terms are frequently used to
refer to this privilege. Wigmore dubbed it the privilege for anti-marital facts. 8 JOHN
H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 210 (McNaughton rev. 1961). Some commentators refer to
it as the adverse testimony privilege as distinguished from the communications privi-
lege. See, e.g., Developments in the Law: Privileged Communications, 98 HARV. L.
REV. 1450, 1563 (1985) [hereinafter Privileged Communications]. This author uses
the term spousal immunity, as do other authors, in recognition of the privilege's origin
as a rule of incompetency to prevent a spouse from testifying. See, e.g., Richard
Lempert, Mason Ladd Lecture: A Right to Every Woman's Evidence, 66 IOWA L.
REV. 725, 726 (1981).
11. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.10 (West 1995).
12. Malinda L. Seymore, Isn't it a Crime: Feminist Perspectives on Spousal Immu-
nity and Spousal Violence, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 801 (1996).
13. ANN JONES, NEXT TIME, SHE'LL BE DEAD: BATTERING AND HOW TO STOP IT
51-52 (1994) (citing Amy Eppler, Battered Women and the Equal Protection Clause:
Will the Constitution Help Them When the Police Won't?, 95 YALE L.J. 788, 801
(1986)). See also Elizabeth A. Stanko, Fear of Crime and the Myth of the Safe Home:
A Feminist Critique of Criminology, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON WIFE ABUSE 75,
78 (Kersti Yllo & Michele Bograd eds., 1988).
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mestic violence offends the peace and dignity of the state. The next
crucial step is for the Texas judiciary to interpret and apply the
spousal crimes exception so as to take into account women's lives and
avoid some of the pitfalls which have led to injustice in other states.
Part I of this article discusses the profiles of batterers and victims as
a predicate for analyzing applications of the spousal immunity privi-
lege in Texas. Part II briefly explores the origin and nature of the
spousal privileges. Part III examines the history of the spousal privi-
lege and spousal crime exception in Texas, and the recent statutory
change. Part IV discusses the application of similar exceptions in
other states. Part V briefly explores the application of the spousal
crime exception to the communications privilege. Finally, Part VI
suggests how Texas courts should properly apply this new rule of evi-
dence in domestic violence cases.
I. THE NATURE OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
Understanding the dynamics of domestic violence is critical when
applying the spousal crime exception to the marital privilege.14 Psy-
chologist Lenore Walker found battering relationships go through a
three-stage cycle of violence: tension-building, acute battering, and
contrition." During the tension-building phase, what is termed minor
battering occurs; the wife16 attempts to calm her abuser by becoming
nurturing and compliant, by anticipating his every whim, or by simply
staying out of his way. 7 Nonetheless, the abuse often escalates, be-
coming more frequent and more serious.18 The second phase is char-
acterized "by the uncontrollable discharge of the tensions that have
built up during phase one."1 9 This phase of severe battering typically
lasts from two-to twenty-four hours.2" The third phase of loving con-
trition follows acute battering. The batterer begs forgiveness and
14. I explore the dynamics of domestic violence more fully in Seymore, supra note
12, at 805-13.
15. LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN 55 (1979). See also DONALD
G. DUTTON, THE DOMESTIC ASSAULT OF WOMEN: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND CRIMINAL
JUSTICE PERSPECTIVES 125 (1995).
16. In accord with current norms of gender-neutrality, authors often refer to bat-
terers and victims generically as spouses. This tends to obscure the reality that wives
are victims and husbands are perpetrators in the vast majority of cases. See LEwis
OKUN, WOMAN ABUSE: FACTS REPLACING MYTHS 39-40 (1986); SUSAN SCHECHTER,
WOMEN AND MALE VIOLENCE: THE VISIONS AND STRUGGLES OF THE BATTERED
WOMEN'S MOVEMENT 214-15 (1982).
17. WALKER, supra note 15, at 56.
18. Id. at 59; DUTrON, supra note 15, at 125. The level of verbal and psychological
abuse rises, and he becomes more possessive and jealous.
19. WALKER, supra note 15, at 59.
20. Id. at 60. During this phase, everything a victim does enrages the batterer. If
she tries to defend herself, he beats her into submission; if she is passive, he beats her
harder. Id. at 61-62. The beating stops only when the batterer exhausts himself or the
victim gets away. Id. at 61.
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promises to change, and never hit again.21 This romantic stage lasts
until the entire cycle starts over again."2 And it will start over - in
battering relationships, the cycle repeats, with the abuse continually
escalating. 3
The typical batterer 4 is a traditionalist who believes in male
supremacy, in the stereotypical masculine sex role in the family, 5 and
in his entitlement to use violence to discipline his wife.2 6 The bat-
terer's feelings of entitlement may be a learned response. Many bat-
terers witnessed their fathers beating their mothers and/or were
beaten themselves.2 7 The typical batterer is driven by a desire to con-
trol his wife.28 This desire often manifests itself in such behaviors as
threatening her if she talks about leaving, tearing the telephone off the
wall to prevent her from calling the police, spying on her house, and
lying in wait to assault her new boyfriend.29 Possessiveness and jeal-
ousy are often common traits of the batterer.3 ° In order to feel secure
the batterer must constantly monitor his wife's every activity, but even
then he remains suspicious of her possible relationships with other
men. His verbal abuse may include accusations that she is having an
affair or affairs. 31 He has learned the best way to control his wife is by
isolating her from others.
21. Id. at 65. He brings flowers and candy; he is loving and charming. Id. at 65-66.
22. Id. at 69.
23. Id. "Most women report that before they know it, the calm, loving behavior
gives way to little battering incidents again. The phase-one tension building recurs, a
new cycle of battering behavior begins." Id.
24. Because the initial focus of the battered women's movement was on the vic-
tim, information about batterers is less extensive. With the growth of treatment pro-
grams for batterers, however, researchers and counselors have been able to construct
more accurate portraits of batterers. Kathleen Waits, The Criminal Justice System's
Response to Battering: Understanding the Problem, Forging the Solution, 60 WASH. L.
REV. 267, 286 n.95 (1985). According to Waits, early information about batterers
came from victims' reports because of the perpetrators' reluctance to talk about their
violent behavior and their tendency to deny or downplay their battering. Id. She
notes the new information coming to light from batterers supports the accuracy of
victim reports. Id.
25. WALKER, supra note 15, at 36.
26. Id. at 14; James Ptacek, Why Do Men Batter Their Wives?, in FEMINIST PER-
SPECTIVES ON WIFE ABUSE, supra note 13, at 133, 146.
27. WALKER, supra note 15, at 38. Walker discovered that even in batterers' child-
hood homes where overt violence was absent, a general lack of respect for women
and children was evident. Id.
28. DuTrrON, supra note 15, at 64. One researcher found power motivation in the
batterers' "need to control or dominate the female, their belief that female indepen-
dence meant loss of male control, and their attempt to persuade or coerce the female
into adopting their definition of how the relationship should be structured and how it
should function." Id.
29. Ptacek, supra note 26, at 151.
30. WALKER, supra note 15, at 37.
31. Id. at 37-38; DuTTON, supra note 15, at 30. The batterer's jealousy also leads
him to drive away his wife's relatives and female friends; his pathological jealousy
extends to the couple's own children. WALKER, supra note 15, at 37-38. His jealousy
of their children helps explain the well-documented fact that battering frequently oc-
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Lenore Walker further identifies a number of characteristics com-
mon to battered women.32 The battered woman is also typically a tra-
ditionalist. Furthermore, she views her husband as the head of the
family, and believes a woman's proper place is in the home even if she
is employed outside the home.33 She feels responsible for maintaining
the peace at home and thus accepts the blame for her husband's vio-
lence. 34 Moreover, she minimizes the seriousness of the battering be-
cause her identity becomes submerged in her spouse's.
In trying to explain why women stay in battering relationships,
Donald Dutton developed the theory of traumatic bonding. Trau-
matic bonding refers to the strong emotional ties that develop in a
relationship as a result of power imbalance and intermittent abuse.35
Further, reinforcement from the contrition phase 36 - love, attention,
romance - makes it difficult to leave. 37 Moreover, the beatings en-
gender learned helplessness, 38 serious impairment of the wife's prob-
lem-solving abilities, 39 and clinical depression making it difficult to
deal with even simple, everyday matters.4° Also, low self-esteem is
common among battered women.41 The battered woman hates herself
for being unable to leave.42 Furthermore, the situation is exacerbated
curs during pregnancy. RICHARD J. GELLES, Violence and Pregnancy: A Note on the
Extent of the Problem and Needed Services, in FAMILY VIOLENCE 111, 111-13 (1987).
32. WALKER, supra note 15, at 31.
33. Id. at 33-34. Battered women who work outside the home often feel guilty
about their work. Id. at 33.
34. Id. at 34.
35. DUTTON, supra note 15, at 191-92; see also Dee L. R. Graham, et al., Survivors
of Terror: Battered Women, Hostages, and the Stockholm Syndrome, in FEMINIST PER-
SPECT IVES ON WIFE ABUSE, supra note 13, at 217, 220-21. Analogies have been
drawn between battered women and hostages. Id. at 217, 222-26.
36. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
37. WALKER, supra note 15, at 66-68.
38. The theory of learned helplessness was developed as a result of experiments
on animals. When subjected to random electric shocks, animals become passive and
compliant after realizing they can not control the punishment. Id. at 45-48.
39. Id. at 48; Jacquelyn C. Campbell, Public-Health Conceptions of Family Abuse,
in ABUSED AND BATrERED: SOCIAL AND LEGAL RESPONSES TO FAMILY VIOLENCE
35, 43 (Dean D. Knudsen & JoAnn L. Miller eds., 1991).
40. WALKER, supra note 15, at 50; CHARLES P. EWING, BATTERED WOMEN WHO
KILL 21 (1987).
41. WALKER, supra note 15, at 32. Walker notes low self-esteem often exists prior
to the marriage and beatings:
Women are systematically taught that their personal worth, survival, and
autonomy do not depend on effective and creative responses to life situa-
tions, but rather on their physical beauty and appeal to men. They learn that
they have no direct control over the circumstances of their lives. Early in
their lives, little girls learn from their parents and society that they are to be
more passive than boys. Having systematically trained to be second best,
women begin marriage with a psychological disadvantage.
Id. at 51.
42. Waits, supra note 24, at 283.
[Vol. 2
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when she is financially dependent on the batterer 3 Children may
also hamper her ability to leave.44
II. SPOUSAL PRIVILEGE
A. The Right to Compel Testimony
"The power of government to compel persons to testify.., is firmly
established in Anglo-American jurisprudence."45 Every state in the
Union has a provision for compulsory process, recognizing the power
of the state government to compel the testimony of witnesses.4 6 Con-
sequently, it is well established in Texas that courts have the inherent
power to summon witnesses and compel their attendance.47 As the
Texas Supreme Court explained in Lehnhard v. Moore, every citizen
has the testimonial duty to disclose information to a court of law.48
The Lehnhard court quoted from Wigmore:
He who will live by society must let society live by him, when it
requires to.
•.. The pettiness and personality of the individual trial disappear
when we reflect that our duty to bear testimony runs not to the
parties in that present cause, but to the community at large and
forever.49
43. See WALKER, supra note 15, at 33-34. Walker found even women who work
outside the home and have an income typically turn their money over to their hus-
bands. Id. They may also ultimately quit working to keep their batterers happy. Id.
at 33. In explaining why it takes so long to leave a batterer, many women report that
the batterer controlled the finances. Id. at 34.
44. Many battered women express the belief that children need their fathers, or
say they stay in the relationship because of the children. Id. at 30.
45. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 443 (1972) (citing 8 JOHN H. WIG-
MORE, EVIDENCE § 2190 (McNaughton rev. 1961)). English law provided that courts
had the power to compel testimony as early as 1562. Id. (citing Statute of Elizabeth,
1562, 5 Eliz., ch. 9, § 12 (Eng.)). By 1742 it was considered an "indubitable certainty"
that "the public has a right to every man's evidence." Id. (quoting the remarks of the
Duke of Argyle and Lord Chancellor Hardwicke,- reported in 12 T. HANSARD, PARL.
HiST. ENG. 675, 693 (1812)). The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution refers to
the right to compulsory process and the Judiciary Act of 1789 provides for compulsory
process of witnesses in federal court. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Act of Sept. 24, 1789,
ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73, 89 (1789). Texas recognizes a criminal defendant has a right of
compulsory process under the Texas Constitution as well as under the U.S. Constitu-
tion. See Green v. State, 887 S.W.2d 230, 232 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1994, no pet.)
(citing TEX. CONST. art. I, § 10). The right of compulsory process also gives a defend-
ant the right to use the power of the law to compel a witness' testimony. Id.; Gonza-
lez v. State, 714 S.W.2d 19, 25 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, no pet.).
46. See, e.g., Ambles v. State, 383 S.E.2d 555, 556-57 (Ga. 1989); Ex parte Weeks,
456 So.2d 404, 408 (Ala. 1984); Mason v. Robinson, 340 N.W.2d 236, 242 (Iowa 1983);
People v. Schweitzer, 187 Cal. Rptr. 696, 698 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982); State v. Gilbert,
326 N.W.2d 744, 746 (Wis. 1982).
47. Burttschell v. Sheppard, 69 S.W.2d 402, 403 (Tex. 1934).
48. Lehnhard v. Moore, 401 S.W.2d 232, 235 (Tex. 1966); see also Mason v. Robin-
son, 340 N.W.2d 236, 242 (Iowa 1983).
49. Lehnhard, 401 S.W.2d at 235 (quoting WIGMORE, supra note 10, § 2192).
1995]
TEXAS WESLEYAN LAW REVIEW
Thus, testifying as a witness is the responsibility of every citizen, re-
gardless of the odious nature of the evidence.5" There are, however,
exceptions to the power to compel testimony. The Fifth Amendment
privilege against compelled self-incrimination is perhaps the most fa-
miliar.5' Other privileges, including the spousal privilege, are excep-
tions as well.
B. Separating the Two Marital Privileges
Two distinct testimonial privileges arise as a result of marriage, and
some confusion ensues because the term marital privilege is often used
to describe both. The spousal immunity privilege prevents the testi-
mony of one spouse against the other,52 while the marital communica-
tions privilege prevents testimony only regarding confidential
communications made during a marriage." Rule 504 of the Texas
Rules of Criminal Evidence encompasses both the spousal immunity
privilege and the marital communications privilege. 4
In most jurisdictions, including Texas, spousal immunity applies
only in criminal cases.55 Both civil and criminal rules of evidence con-
tain the communications privilege, but only the criminal rule contains
the privilege to refuse to testify.56 The privilege arises upon a mar-
riage between the witness spouse and the defendant spouse, and ter-
minates upon divorce. 57 Spousal immunity works as a complete bar to
testimony, regardless of the subject matter. 58 The marital communica-
tions privilege only protects against disclosure of confidential commu-
nications made during marriage. 9 The marital status of the spouses at
the time of the trial is immaterial, so long as the communication was
made during marriage.6"
50. Villarreal v. State, 860 S.W.2d 647, 649 (Tex. App.-Waco 1993, no pet.).
51. The U.S. Supreme Court calls it the most important exception to the compul-
sory power. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444 (1972). See also Bridge v.
State, 726 S.W.2d 558, 567 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986).
52. 2 DAVID W. LOUISELL & CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE
§ 217 (1985).
53. Id.
54. TEX. R. CRIM. EVID. 504.
55. See David Medine, The Adverse Testimony Privilege: Time to Dispose of a
"Sentimental Relic," 67 OR. L. REV. 519, 520 n.8 (1988).
56. See TEX. R. CIv. EVID. 504; TEX. R. CRIM. EVID. 504.
57. See Freeman v. State, 786 S.W.2d 56, 58 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1990,
no pet.) (once divorced, a spouse is no longer disqualified from testifying); see also
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 66, at 162 (Edward W. Cleary ed., 3d ed. 1984); 25
CHARLES A. WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCE-
DURE § 5572 (1989).
58. LOUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 52, § 218.
59. Id.
60. TEX. R. CRIM. EVID. 504(1)(b) ("A person... has a privilege during their
marriage and afterwards to refuse to disclose ... a confidential communication made
to his spouse while they were married."); CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C.
KIRKPATRICK, MODERN EVIDENCE § 5.33, at 603, § 5.34, at 609 (1995).
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When discussing marital testimonial privileges, it is important to un-
derstand who holds each privilege,'and thus who has the authority to
invoke or waive the privilege. The testifying spouse is the holder of
the immunity privilege,6" while the defendant spouse is the holder of
the communications privilege. 2 When a witness currently married to
the defendant spouse is called to testify regarding confidential com-
munications made during marriage, both privileges apply and either
may be invoked to prevent testimony.63 In a number of situations,
however, there is no overlap of the two privileges. For example, if a
former spouse is called to testify, the ex-spouse is barred from testify-
ing about confidential communications made during marriage, even
though the spousal immunity privilege does not apply.' If a commu-
nication between the spouses occurs in the presence of a third person,
thus destroying confidentiality and rendering the communications
privilege inapplicable,65 a current spouse called to testify may still re-
fuse to testify by invoking spousal immunity. If the testifying spouse
waives the immunity privilege, but the defendant spouse invokes the
communications privilege, the testifying spouse may testify but cannot
reveal any confidential communications made during marriage.
C. Justifications for the Marital Privileges
Privileges, which contravene the usual rule that the government is
entitled to "every man's evidence,"66 are usually justified on public
policy grounds.67 With respect to the marital privileges, the societal
interests most often offered to justify excluding evidence include: 1)
61. See TEX. R. CRIM. EVID. 504(2)(a) ("The spouse of the accused has a privilege
not to be called [to testify]," which means the testifying spouse holds the spousal
immunity privilege); Johnson v. State, 803 S.W.2d 272, 281 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (en
banc); Gibbons v. State, 794 S.W.2d 887, 893 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1990, no pet.).
62. See TEX. R. CRIM. EVID. 504(1)(b)-(c). The Texas rule is quite typical. The
holder of the communications privilege is generally the communicant spouse., that is,
the spouse who made the statement. WRIGHT & GRAHAM. supra note 57, §§ 5586-
5587.
63. "The testimonial privilege [spousal immunity] is the broader of the two in that
it precludes all adverse testimony by the spouse, not merely disclosure of confidential
communications." MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 60, § 5.33, at 603.
64. See, e.g., Freeman v. State, 786 S.W.2d 56, 58 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist]
1990, no pet.); Allen v. State, 761 S.W.2d 384, 387 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1988, pet. ref'd); see also Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 6 (1954); MUELLER &
KIRKPATRICK, supra note 60, § 5.33, at 603.
65. See TEX. R. CRIM. EVID. 504(1)(a) (confidential communication protected by
the privilege is one "made privately by any person to his spouse"); Gibson v. State,
516 S.W.2d 406, 409 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974); see also Wolfle v. United States, 291 U.S.
7, 14 (1934); United States v. Crouthers, 669 F.2d 635, 642 (10th Cir. 1982).
66. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 443 (1972) (quoting the remarks of the
Duke of Argyle and Lord Chancellor Hardwicke, reported in 12 T. HANSARD, PARL.
HIST. ENG. 675, 693 (1812)).
67. See Privileged Communications, supra note 10, at 1584-85; Steven Goode &
M. Michael Sharlot, Article V" Privileges, 30 Hous. L. REV. 489, 489 (1993).
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fostering marital intimacy; 2) protecting privacy; and 3) preventing
marital discord.68
1. Marital Intimacy
One Texas court eulogized the privilege in the following language:
The happiness of the married state requires that there should be the
most unlimited confidence between husband and wife; and this con-
fidence the law secures by providing that it shall be kept forever
inviolable; that nothing shall be extracted from the bosom of the
wife which was confided there by the husband.69
Another court added this bit of purple prose: "We will not incumber
[sic] this opinion to panegyrize the sacred relation of married life and
that wise rule of evidence that prohibits either one of the spouses,
against the will of the other, to lift the screen of privacy to public gaze
"70
This intimacy justification breaks down, however, under scrutiny.
The obvious question is whether the existence of the spousal privilege
significantly affects marital conduct, if at all. In order to accept the
notion that spouses speak freely to each other because of the exist-
ence of the communications privilege, one must assume spouses know
about the privilege. Robert M. Hutchins and Donald Slesinger argue
the privilege has no effect on marital communications:
[V]ery few people ever get into court, and practically no one outside
the legal profession knows anything about the rules regarding privi-
leged communications between spouses. As far as the writers are
aware ... marital harmony among lawyers who know about privi-
leged communications is not vastly superior to that of other profes-
sional groups.71
The difficulty in accepting the notion that the marital privilege fosters
free communication is exacerbated by the narrowness of the privilege,
which applies only in court.
68. See Privileged Communications, supra note 10, at 1584-85; Jaymi B. Zwain,
Note, Evidence - Privilege Against Adverse Spousal Testimony - In a Federal Crim-
inal Proceeding Choice of Whether to Testify Against a Defendant Spouse Belongs to
Witness Spouse Alone, 55 TUL. L. REV. 961, 970-71 (1981); Charles L. Black, Jr., The
Marital and Physician Privileges - A Reprint of a Letter to a Congressman, 1975
DUKE L.J. 45, 47 (1975); Mark Reutlinger, Policy, Privacy, and Prerogatives: A Criti-
cal Examination of the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence as They Affect Marital
Privilege, 61 CAL. L. REV. 1353, 1370-71 (1973); David W. Louisell, Confidentiality,
Conformity and Confusion: Privileges in Federal Court Today, 31 TUL. L. REV. 101,
110 (1956). See also WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 57, § 5572, at 493-95; Goode &
Sharlot, supra note 67, at 542.
69. Lanham v. Lanham, 145 S.W. 336, 338 (Tex. 1912).
70. Wiggins v. Tiller, 230 S.W. 253, 254 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1921, no
writ).
71. Robert M. Hutchins & Donald Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of
Evidence: Family Relations, 13 MINN. L. REV. 675, 682 (1929).
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[A] married person must recognize that no guarantee exists to en-
sure that his or her confidences will not ... be divulged to any and
all. Intimate marital communications ... are inevitably at risk of
disclosure to the other spouse's relatives, workmates, and friends
without the State taking any action to prevent or redress the
"injury." 72
Nor can a spouse expect the state to redress his or her injury when the
other spouse discloses confidential matters to the police.73
2. Privacy
Proponents argue marital privileges are necessary expressions of a
right to privacy. This argument presumes a spouse testifying volunta-
rily violates a defendant spouse's privacy interest in "prevent[ing] dis-
semination of any personal information. '74 Proponents also contend
the use of contempt powers to compel a reluctant spouse's testimony
constitutes "blatant governmental intrusion into private relation-
ships."'7 5 However, when presented with a constitutional privacy argu-
ment in support of the privilege, courts have consistently rejected it.76
Feminist legal scholars have long realized that the absence of law in
the private sphere contributes to male dominance and female subordi-
nation.77 "The rhetoric of privacy that has insulated the female world
72. Goode & Sharlot, supra note 67, at 544.
73. See Perkins v. State, 698 S.W.2d 762 (Tex. App.-Austin 1985, no pet.). In
Perkins, the defendant told his wife he had killed two men that night. Id. at 763. Mrs.
Perkins told her brother, who told Floyd Chambers, who told the Austin Police De-
partment. Id. The police conceded that without hearing from Chambers, they would
not have considered Mr. Perkins a suspect. Id. Perkins argued the police violated the
spousal privilege by using his comment as a basis for focusing an investigation on him,
and by using that statement for probable cause on which to base a warrant. Id. The
appellate court readily rejected his argument because the privilege applies only to
testimony and only in a criminal proceeding. Neither of these were applicable in this
case. Id. at 763-64.
74. Privileged Communications, supra note 10, at 1583.
75. Id. at 1584.
76. See Port v. Heard, 764 F.2d 423, 430 (5th Cir. 1985); United States v. Lefko-
witz, 618 F.2d 1313, 1319 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Doe, 478 F.2d 194, 195 (1st
Cir. 1973). Nonetheless, arguments regarding privacy are frequently offered as ratio-
nales for one or both of the marital privileges. See Privileged Communications, supra
note 10, at 1584-85; Zwain, supra note 68, at 970; Black, supra note 68, at 47;
Reutlinger, supra note 68, at 1370-71; Louisell, supra note 68, at 110. See also
WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 57, § 5572, at 493-95.
77. "Historically, the dichotomy of 'public' and 'private' has been viewed as an
important construct for understanding gender." Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Violence
of Privacy, 23 CONN. L. REV. 973, 976 (1991) [hereinafter Schneider, The Violence of
Privacy]. See also Anne C. Dailey, Constitutional Privacy and the Just Family, 67 TUL.
L. REV. 955, 967 (1993). Early struggles for women's rights, exemplified by the suf-
frage movement, protested women's exclusion from the public sphere. Frances Olsen,
Statutory Rape: A Feminist Critique of Rights Analysis, 63 TEX. L. REV. 387, 392-93
(1984); Nadine Taub & Elizabeth M. Schneider, Women's Subordination and the Role
of Law, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 151, 151-52 (David
Kairys ed., rev. 1990). The private sphere, the home, was seen as a place of refuge, a
haven in a heartless public world of politics and business. Dailey, supra, at 966-67
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from the legal order sends an important ideological message to the
rest of society. It devalues women and their functions and says wo-
men are not important enough to merit legal regulation."78
Spousal immunity, especially in cases of domestic violence, may be
viewed as a way to keep violence hidden in the private sphere.
Courts' interpretations of spousal violence exceptions rely on distinc-
tions between private and public harm. While recognizing that many
crimes may harm the public, courts tend to view domestic violence as
personal to the victim. Courts applying the spousal violence exception
fall back on traditional notions of the public/private dichotomy.
Moreover, the argument that the government should not compel a re-
luctant spouse to testify merely reinforces the traditional notion that
the law does not belong in the private sphere of family relations. "The
freedom promised by the right to privacy runs up against women's
right[s] to security in the home, and rights rhetoric cannot decide the
conflict.... [A]ny effort to keep the state out of our personal lives will
leave us subject to private domination."79
3. Marital Harmony
Preventing marital discord is the justification most often cited for
the spousal immunity privilege. Marital harmony is threatened when
one spouse testifies against the other.8° The United States Supreme
Court discounts this justification in cases where one spouse is willing
to testify against the other. In such cases, there is no marital peace to
preserve.8 ' Professor Wigmore also readily rejects the marital har-
mony justification:
That is to say, if the promotion of marital peace, and the apprehen-
sion of marital dissension, are the ultimate ground [sic] of the privi-
lege, it is an overgenerous assumption that the wife who has been
beaten, poisoned or deserted is still on such terms of delicate good
feeling with her spouse that her testimony must not be enforced lest
the iridescent halo of peace be dispelled by the breath of disparag-
ing testimony. And if there were, conceivably, any such peace,
would it be a peace such as the law could desire to protect? Could it
be any other peace than that which the tyrant secures for himself by
oppression?8
(citing CHRISTOPHER LASCH, HAVEN IN A HEARTLESS WORLD: THE FAMILY BE-
SIEGED (1979)). Even the U.S. Constitution was interpreted to recognize a "private
realm of family life which the state cannot enter." Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S.
158, 166 (1944) (cited in Dailey, supra, at 984). For further explanation, see Seymore,
supra note 12, at 840-42.
78. Schneider, The Violence of Privacy, supra note 77, at 978.
79. Olsen, supra note 77, at 393.
80. Privileged Communications, supra note 10, at 1568.
81. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 52 (1980).
82. WIGMORE, supra note 10, § 2239, at 243.
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One author even suggests the existence of the privilege itself may dis-
rupt marital harmony:
[T]he privilege to refuse to testify may be more disruptive to family
harmony than a rule compelling spousal testimony. With compelled
testimony, the state is responsible for forcing a spouse to testify,
thus removing any blame that might be aimed at a testifying spouse.
When a spouse voluntarily testifies, however, the blame for the tes-
timony is directed at the spouse, with certain disruption of the
marriage. 83
Nonetheless, marital harmony remains a popular justification. One
commentator on the Texas rule of spousal immunity explains as
follows:
Many believe it would be against the public interest to force a
spouse to testify against his or her partner in such a situation....
[M]any wives do reconcile with their husbands and drop the
charges. To compel them to testify in a case they no longer wish to
see prosecuted would interfere with marital harmony, and would
probably disrupt the very relationship that the privilege was devel-
oped to protect. As with all privileges, it is a trade-off, but one
which is probably worthwhile in the long run.84
This trade-off seems "worthwhile in the long run" only because the
legal system, created by privileged white men, ignores the reality of
women's lives: "[W]omen suffer in ways which men do not, and...
the gender-specific suffering that women endure is routinely ignored
or trivialized in the larger (male) legal culture. '85 To suggest that rec-
onciling with a battering spouse and dropping criminal charges is
proof that marital harmony exists and should be preserved ignores
what is known about the dynamics of domestic violence, and the effect
such violence has upon the lives of women. 86 "One of the reasons for
the infrequent prosecution of spousal assault is that the defendant
spouse coerces the victim spouse into invoking the privilege against
her own desires .... 87
The existence of a number of exceptions allowing for compelled
spousal testimony illuminates the hypocrisy of the marital harmony
83. Debbie S. Holmes, Marital Privileges in the Criminal Context. The Need for a
Victim Spouse Exception in Texas Rule of Criminal Evidence 504, 28 Hous. L. REV.
1095. 1109 (1991).
84. Royal L. Mullins, Texas Developments: The Texas Rules of Criminal Evidence:
501 to 504; Privileges, 13 AM. J. CRIM. L. 221, 237 (1986).
85. Seymore, supra note 12, at 834 (quoting Robin L. West, The Difference in Wo-
men's Hedonic Lives: A Phenomenological Critique of Feminist Legal Theory, 3 Wis.
WOMEN'S L.J. 81 (1987)). See also Kit Kinports, Evidence Engendered, 1991 U. ILL.
L. REV. 413, 414; Judith Resnik, On the Bias: Feminist Reconsiderations of the Aspira-
tions For Our Judges, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1877, 1906 (1988); Christine A. Littleton,
Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1279 (1987); Deborah L. Rhode,
Feminist Critical Theories, 42 STAN. L. REV. 617, 619 (1990).
86. See supra text accompanying notes 14-44.
87. Goode & Sharlot, supra note 67, at 562.
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justification. The same marital discord feared as a result of compel-
ling a battered spouse to testify also exists when a spouse is compelled
to testify about injury to a child or any other member of the house-
hold.88 There are, of course, strong public policy reasons for requiring
testimony in cases where children are victimized. These exceptions,
however, go further by allowing the state to compel testimony when
any adult member of the household - "aged parents, aunts, uncles,
adult children, adults in foster care, perhaps even the English but-
ler"89 - is the victim of a crime committed by a spouse. While this
apparent concern for the welfare of live-in housekeepers is commend-
able, the blatant disregard for the welfare of wives is disturbing. As to
the housekeeper, the law's message is that a crime against this victim
is an offense that offends the peace and dignity of the state. As to the
wife, the law's message is that this is a purely private matter between
husband and wife, and the state will not intervene unless the wife mar-
shals the evidence and prosecutes the case. Thus, wife abuse becomes
a species of tort, rather than crime.90
III. HISTORY OF THE SPOUSAL CRIME EXCEPTION IN TEXAS
A. Spousal Immunity: 1856 to 1965
Texas had a spousal crime exception to the spousal privilege as early
as 1856. Article 648 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, reenacted in
1879, 1895, 1911 and again in 1925 under new article designations,
originally provided, "The husband and wife can in no case testify
against each other, except in a criminal prosecution for an offence
committed by one against the other; but they may, in all criminal pros-
ecutions, be witnesses for each other."91 This rule of incompetency
88. TEX. R. CRIM. EVID. 504.
89. Goode & Sharlot, supra note 67, at 564.
90. The author explores this theme more fully in a forthcoming article. See
Seymore, supra note 12, at 824.
91. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 648 (1856) (repealed by TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.
art. 735 (1879)). Article 648 was reenacted with no substantive change as article 735.
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 735 (1879) (repealed by TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art.
775 (1895)). Less than seventeen years later, article 735 was reenacted with no sub-
stantive change as article 775. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 775 (1895) (repealed by
TEX. CODE. CRIM. PROC. art. 795 (1911)). Article 775 was reenacted, again with no
substantive change, as article 795. TEX. CODE. CRIM. PROC. art. 795 (1911) (repealed
by TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 714 (1925)). The marital communications privilege
has existed since 1856 and was similarly reenacted through the years until 1925. See
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 647 (1856) (repealed by TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art.
734 (1879)); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 734 (1879) (repealed by TEX. CODE CRIM.
PROC. art. 774 (1895)); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 774 (1895) (repealed by TEX.
CODE. CRIM. PROC. art. 794 (1911)); TEX. CODE. CRIM. PROC art. 794 (1911) (re-
pealed by TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 714 (1925)). The 1925 repeal occurred so the
two statutes could be reenacted in combined form:
Neither husband nor wife shall, in any case, testify as to communications
made by one to the other, while married; nor shall they, after the marriage
relation ceases, be made witnesses as to any such communication made
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did not allow the wife to testify even voluntarily against her husband
except in cases of spousal crime.92 The statute did, however, allow the
state to compel the wife's testimony when a crime was committed by
the husband against her.93
Historically, courts read these statutes narrowly, interpreting "of-
fense committed by one against the other" to include only crimes of
violence against the person of the spouse.94 These interpretations did
not include property crimes, such as when the husband stole the wife's
mule, 95 or nonviolent offenses against the wife, such as slander, 96 big-
amy,97 or adultery.98 Nor did they include crimes of violence against
other family members, such as aggravated assault against a stepchild.99
B. Spousal Immunity: 1965 to 1986
Major amendments to the spousal immunity statute came in 1965,
reading in pertinent part:
The husband and wife may, in all criminal actions, be witnesses for
each other, but except as hereinafter provided, they shall in no case
testify against each other in a criminal prosection. However, a wife
or husband may voluntarily testify against each other in any case for
an offense involving any grade of assault or violence committed by
while the marriage relation existed, except in a case where one or the other
is prosecuted for an offense; and a declaration or communication made by
the wife to the husband, or by the husband to the wife, goes to extenuate or
justify an offense for which either is on trial. The husband and wife may, in
all criminal actions, be witnesses for each other; but they shall in no case
testify against each other except in a criminal prosecution for an offense
committed by one against the other.
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 714 (1925), repealed by Act of June 18, 1965, 59th Leg.,
R.S., ch. 722, 1965 Tex. Gen. Laws 317, 467. For application of these statutes, see
Johnson v. State, 11 S.W. 667, 668 (Tex. Crim. App. 1889); Miller v. State, 40 S.W. 313.
314 (Tex. Crim. App. 1897); Eads v. State, 170 S.W. 145, 147 (Tex. Crim. App. 1914);
Norwood v. State, 192 S.W. 248, 254 (Tex. Crim. App. 1917); Vickers v. State, 242
S.W. 1032, 1038 (Tex. Crim. App. 1922); Hilton v. State, 191 S.W.2d 875, 875-76 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1945); Morris v. State, 198 S.W.2d 901, 904 (Tex. Crim. App. 1946).
92. See Spivey v. State, 77 S.W. 444 (Tex. Crim. App. 1903).
93. See Bramlette v. State, 2 S.W. 765, 766 (Tex. Ct. App. 1886); Hall v. State, 21
S.W. 368 (Tex. Crim. App. 1893).
94. See Purdy v. State, 97 S.W. 480, 480 (Tex. Crim. App. 1906); Murray v. State,
86 S.W. 1024, 1024 (Tex. Crim. App. 1905); Baxter v. State, 31 S.W. 394, 394 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1895): Navarro v. State. 6 S.W. 542, 543 (Tex. Ct. App. 1887); Bramlette, 2
S.W. at 766; Overton v. State, 43 Tex. 616, 618-19 (1875).
95. Overton, 43 Tex. at 618-19.
96. Baxter, 31 S.W. at 394.
97. Boyd v. State, 26 S.W. 1080 (Tex. Crim. App. 1894).
98. McLean v. State, 24 S.W. 898 (Tex. Crim. App. 1894).
99. Johnson v. State, 11 S.W. 34 (Tex. Ct. App. 1889) (1879 version of the statute);
Rogers v. State, 368 S.W.2d 772 (Tex. Crim. App. 1963) (1925 version of the statute)
(wife's written statement describing husband's assault on their child was not admissi-
ble even though husband injured wife during same episode); Robbins v. State, 200
S.W. 525 (Tex. Crim. App. 1918) (1911 version of statute) (wife's dying declaration
inadmissible in trial where husband was charged with killing his boss, not his wife who
was shot and killed in same episode).
1995]
254 TEXAS WESLEYAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2
one against the other or against any child of either under sixteen
years of age .... or in any case where either is charged with an
offense ... pertaining to wife or child desertion or wilful failure or
refusal to support his or her minor children.10
0
These amendments broadened the type of criminal offenses in which
the wife could serve as a competent witness, and codified the courts'
rigid interpretations of crimes against a spouse to encompass only "as-
sault or violence committed by one against the other."'' Although
the state could compel the wife's testimony under the prior law, the
amended statute permitted the spouse to refuse to testify even in cases
of violence against her or her children. 10 2 The apparent rationale for
restricting the state's power to compel testimony and leaving the mat-
ter in the hands of the testifying spouse was that compulsion was no
longer needed once the wife had the right to testify voluntarily.
Surely the battered spouse wanted to testify! And if she did not, then
one must assume marital harmony existed and should be preserved. 03
This view exhibits an almost deliberate ignorance of the nature and
100. Act of June 18, 1965, 59th Leg., R.S., ch. 722, 1965 Tex. Gen. Laws 317, 467
(codified at TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC ANN. art. 38.11 (West 1979)). The statute was
further amended in 1974 to include the right to testify voluntarily "in any case where
either is charged with bigamy, or in any case where either is charged with interference
with child custody," and to modify the provision regarding nonsupport to include both
the children and the spouse. Act of June 14, 1973, 63rd Leg., R.S., ch. 399, § 2(4),
1973 Tex. Gen. Laws 883, 972. Cases decided after the effective date of the 1965
change differ little from cases decided under the former statutes. See, e.g., Carabajal
v. State, 477 S.W.2d 640 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972); Johnigan v. State, 482 S.W.2d 209
(Tex. Crim. App. 1972); Burns v. State, 556 S.W.2d 270 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
101. In exploring the history of the spousal violence exception, the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals wrote:
While there was a change in language [between article 714 and article 38.11],
it appears the change was to write into the statute the interpretation given
the former statutes. A search of the various commentaries on the 1965 revi-
sion of the Code and some of the drafts of the State Bar's Committee on the
Revision of the Code of Criminal Procedure did not indicate any alteration
in the law was intended. And since the 1965 amendment the courts have not
interpreted the language as having a different meaning than the former
language....
Article 38.11, as enacted in 1965 and as amended in 1973, like the preced-
ing statutes, continued to provide a privilege that may be waived and a dis-
qualification that is absolute.
Willard v. State, 719 S.W.2d 595, 599 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (en banc) (citations
omitted). Under this new version of the statute, Texas courts uniformly held the
wife's testimony was not admissible in crimes of violence against third persons, even
when the violence occurred against the wife. See, e.g., Velasquez v. State, 727 S.W.2d
580 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987); Young v. State, 603 S.W.2d 851 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel
Op.] 1980); Acker v. State, 421 S.W.2d 398 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967).
102. See, e.g., Wall v. State, 417 S.W.2d 59 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967) (wife may refuse
to testify, and cannot be compelled to testify, where husband is charged with raping
their daughter).
103. See supra text accompanying notes 14-44 discussing the dynamics of domestic
violence, which explains why battered wives are reluctant to testify.
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consequences of domestic violence. In limiting the spousal crime ex-
ception to crimes of violence against the spouse, the Texas Legislature
disregarded the significance of conduct true to common patterns of
battering relationships. Moreover, leaving the decision to testify in
the hands of a victim ignored the well-documented behavior of victims
of spousal violence.
C. Spousal Immunity: 1986 to 1995
As part of the codification of the 1986 Rules of Criminal Evidence,
the rule of spousal immunity changed again. 104 Rule 504 of the Texas
Rules of Criminal Evidence repealed and replaced article 38.11:
(2) Privilege not to be called as a witness against spouse.
(a) General rule of privilege. The spouse of the accused has a privi-
lege not to be called as a witness for the state. This rule does not
prohibit the spouse from testifying voluntarily for the state, even
over objection by the accused....
(b) Exceptions. Except in a proceeding where the accused is
charged with a crime committed during the marriage against the
spouse, there is no privilege under this rule (1) in a proceeding in
which an accused is charged with a crime against the person of anY
minor child or any member of the household of either spouse....'
Unlike Article 38.11, which was limited to voluntary testimony only in
crimes of violence against the spouse, Rule 504 allows one spouse to
testify voluntarily against the other in any proceeding. Nonetheless,
this enactment recognizes not all spouses will testify voluntarily. Con-
sequently, the state has the power to compel testimony when the
crime involves minor children or any member of the household except
the testifying spouse. Construing Rule 504, the Fuentes v. State'1
6
court held that a wife assaulted by her husband may refuse to testify
against him. 117 Again, the rationale was that a spousal violence excep-
tion is unnecessary when the victim spouse voluntarily testifies.
D. Spousal Immunity as of September 1, 1995108
The previous discussion sets forth the state of the law prior to the
1995 legislative enactment of article 38.10. The application of the
spousal immunity privilege in domestic violence cases in Texas engen-
104. Act of May 26, 1985, 69th Leg., R.S., ch. 685, § 9(b)(2), 1985 Tex. Gen. Laws
2472, 2474 (current version at TEX. R. CRIM. EvID. 504).
105. TEX. R. CRIM. EVID. 504.
106. 775 S.W.2d 64 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, no pet.).
107. Id. at 66.
108. The new rule applies in trials after September 1, 1995, regardless of when the
offense was committed. In other words, applying the new rule to offenses committed
before September 1, 1995, will not be a prohibited retroactive application of the law.
See Freeman v. State, 786 S.W.2d 56, 59 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, no
pet.).
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dered some criticism."°9 The Final Report of the Gender Bias Task
Force of Texas11° indicates a growing awareness among social workers,
lawyers, and judges of the difficulties associated with leaving the
choice to testify in the hands of the battered spouse:
I'm working with a client right now who was battered by her hus-
band severely .... She did file charges against the man. However,
because of his threats, he was able to convince her to drop the
charges.
In our judicial system, as it stands, a spouse cannot be forced to
testify against the other spouse unless it's a case of child abuse....
Therefore, the court puts the burden on the woman for going
through with the charges, which gives the batterer a wedge to use.
If the courts took the decision out of the woman's hands and the
courts went ahead and said, "No, it's the state that's filing charges.
It's out of your hands. It's the state that files the charges," she
would then have a little protection from his, and sometimes his at-
torney's threats.11'
A number of attorney respondents suggested victim behavior is par-
tially responsible for some prosecutors' attitudes toward family vio-
lence cases.' 1 2 As one respondent commented, "The problem is most
wives invoke [the] marital privilege and refuse to testify." 1 3 A judge
responding to the Gender Bias Task Force's Judicial Attitudes Survey
commented:
[Tlhe law would be more effective if the prosecutors had some way
to force a spouse to testify to the abuse. In the circle of domestic
violence, the abuser becomes immediately apologetic and the
abused quickly loses her resolve to prosecute. The privilege in Rule
504 [of the Rules of Criminal Evidence] should be changed, i.e.,
eliminate the privilege regarding spousal abuse.
14
In response to the findings of the Gender Bias Task Force, the Texas
Senate created an Interim Committee on Domestic Violence. The
Senate Committee initially produced three proposals with regard to
spousal immunity:
109. See, e.g., Goode & Sharlot, supra note 67; Holmes, supra note 83.
110. On June 1, 1991, the Supreme Court of Texas entered an order creating the
Gender Bias Task Force. Barbara B. Aldave, Letter of Introduction to STATE BAR OF
TEXAS, THE GENDER BIAS TASK FORCE OF TEXAS, FINAL REPORT (Feb. 1994). The
court asked the Task Force "to consider whether gender bias [exists] in the judicial
system in Texas, and, if such gender bias does exist, to determine the nature and
extent of such bias and to propose measures for its reduction and ultimate elimina-
tion." Id. (alteration in original). For two and one-half years, the Task Force sur-
veyed judges and lawyers for their opinions, and held public hearings to gather
testimony of hundreds of attorneys, judges, professors, advocates, former litigants,
and members of the general public. Id.
111. STATE BAR OF TEXAS, supra note 7, at 70-71 (testimony of Peggy Salinas).
112. Id. at 74.
113. Id. (Attorney Survey, male, age 42).
114. Id. at 71 (Judge Survey, female, age 39) (alteration in original).
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Option 1: Modify the statutes to remove the spousal privilege in
cases where the spouse is the victim of domestic violence.
Option 2: Modify the statutes to remove the spousal privilege in
cases where the spouse is the victim of domestic violence
and the incident was witnessed by a minor child.115
Option 3: Send a resolution to the Court of Criminal Appeals re-
questing they re-visit Rule 504 in the context of a spouse-
victim.
l 6
The version reported from the Committee was Option 1. In the Final
Report of the Senate Interim Committee on Domestic Violence, the
Committee made the following recommendation:
The Committee requests the Court of Criminal Appeals to modify
spousal privilege only in cases where the spouse is also the victim of
domestic violence. Should the Court not respond by February 1,
1995, the Committee will file legislation to modify the Code of
Criminal Procedure to create this exception.' 1 7
The Committee made this recommendation after public hearings, tele-
phone conversations, and correspondence with hundreds of Texas citi-
zens."' "Persons in the criminal justice system testifying before the
Committee suggested [the rule of spousal immunity] often allow[s]
some of the worst perpetrators of violence to go free, with no hope of
meaningful intervention."'"19 Many domestic violence cases have only
one witness, the victim, and prosecutors are often forced to drop cases
because the victim witness invokes the privilege.' 2 ° The Committee
115. This option was wisely rejected. Adoption of such an exception would have
reinforced the notion that spousal violence is not a crime unless someone other than
the spouse suffers, that is, the children witnessing the assault. Such an exception
would also be difficult to administer. From where would we find proof that the as-
sault happened in front of the children? If the victim spouse can claim a privilege not
to testify, and the defendant spouse can claim a Fifth Amendment privilege not to
testify, then that testimony could only come from the child. Calling children to testify
against their parents is always problematic.
116. SENATE INTERIM COMMITTEE ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, SUMMARY OF PRO-
POSED RECOMMENDATIONS 4.
117. SENATE INTERIM COMMITTEE ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, REPORT TO THE 74TH
LEGISLATURE 74 (Dec. 1994) [hereinafter SENATE REPORT].
118. Letter from Senator Mike Moncrief, Chairman, Senate Interim Committee on
Domestic Violence, to Bob Bullock, Lieutenant Governor of Texas 1 (Nov. 3, 1994)
(on file with author).
119. SENATE REPORT, supra note 117, at 73.
120. Id. at 73-74. The committee held public hearings in San Antonio, Texas, at
which participants discussed a number of topics including spousal immunity. One
witness, a criminal district attorney, suggested there would be no need for modifying
the spousal immunity rule if a case was properly documented. SENATE INTERIM COM-
MITTEE ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, SAN ANTONIO PUBLIC HEARING 2 (testimony of
Steven Hilbig, Bexar County Criminal District Attorney). A judge suggested police
officers should take more pictures of victims' injuries, and should document family
violence calls. According to the judge, this diminishes the need for requiring a victim
to testify. Id. (testimony of Judge Reed). Nonetheless, the Committee found in many
cases the victim's testimony is indispensable, and the existence of the privilege pre-
vented prosecution of the case. SENATE REPORT, supra note 117, at 73.
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found even where the prosecuting attorney's office adopts a "No Drop
Policy, ' 121 more than fifty percent of domestic violence cases are dis-
missed because the victim spouse claims his or her privilege. 122
The Committee affirmed the principle that domestic violence is a
crime against the state as well as a crime against the person.1 2 3 Thus,
a victim does not have control over filing the charges. However, the
victim may invoke the privilege and refuse to testify. When this oc-
curs, the victim gains control of the proceeding and hinders the prose-
cution's ability to pursue the crime against the state. Further, as the
Committee noted, "[d]efense attorneys may inform the batterer of
this provision in the law allowing them to conduct a campaign, with
the help of family and friends, to persuade or threaten the victim not
to testify. ' 124  Thus, the Committee believed that removing the
spousal privilege relieves the pressure on married victims by placing
the responsibility for dropping charges or prosecuting the case in the
hands of the prosecuting authority, where it belongs. 125
The Committee acknowledged that removing the privilege might
subject testifying victims to retaliation from their abusers,1 26 render
victims powerless within the system, 27 and give prejudiced courts the
power to further victimize spousal assault victims by jailing them for
contempt. In response, the Committee reported that no backlash or
121. See Corsilles, supra note 6. The Committee explained "no drop policies" as
follows:
While the actual policy statements differ, there is one main philosophy be-
hind such policies. The victim of a domestic violence case can submit a
signed affidavit to the prosecuting attorney's office that he or she would like
the charges dropped, but the prosecuting attorney continues to prosecute the
case if at all possible.
SENATE REPORT, supra note 117, at 73.
122. SENATE REPORT, supra note 117, at 74.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Women faced with deciding whether to testify frequently express fear of retali-
ation. Corsilles, supra note 6, at 873. While this fear should not be minimized, some
current empirical data suggests prosecutions do not increase a victim's risk of being
subjected to repeat violence. David A. Ford, Preventing and Provoking Wife Battery
Through Criminal Sanctioning: A Look at the Risks, in ABUSED AND BATTERED: SO-
CIAL AND LEGAL RESPONSES TO FAMILY VIOLENCE, supra note 39, at 207-08. In fact,
one study by David Ford and Mary J. Regoli found prosecutorial action through an
initial court hearing significantly reduced the chance of further violence during the
first six months after a case was disposed. David A. Ford & Mary J. Regoli, Preven-
tive Impacts of Policies for Prosecuting Wife Batterers, in INTRODUCTION TO DOMES-
TIC VIOLENCE: THE CHANGING CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESPONSE 181, 193 (Eve S.
Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa eds., 1992). While the Ford/Regoli study does not specifi-
cally address the issue of whether a victim testifies, its results lend support to the
notion that requiring a victim to testify will not subject her to further violence. See
Seymore, supra note 12, at 848. In fact, some batterers may cease harassing their
victims after they realize the victim no longer controls the case. Corsilles, supra note
6, at 873-74.
127. SENATE REPORT, supra note 117, at 74.
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contempt charges have resulted against unmarried victims where no
privilege existed. 128 Further, prosecutors testified before the Commit-
tee that nonspouse victims of domestic violence are often relieved
when the decision to testify rests with the court rather than the
victim.
129
The Senate Committee concluded by stating only the Texas Court
of Criminal Appeals may change the Rules of Criminal Evidence.
Witnesses testified that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals was
asked to consider changing or modifying spousal immunity in Rule
504, but at the time of the Final Report, the court had taken no ac-
tion.130 The Committee further concluded, "The Legislature could af-
fect [sic] the same changes by passing statutory exceptions in the
Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.' 13' Consequently,.Senate Bill 128
amended the Code of Criminal Procedure by adding article 38.10 to
read as follows:
Art. 38.10 Exceptions to the Spousal Adverse Testimony Privilege.
The privilege of a person's spouse not to be called as a witness for
the state does not apply in any proceeding in which the person is
charged with a crime committed against the person's spouse, a mi-
nor child, or a member of the household of either spouse.132
Senate Bill 128 included a number of provisions relevant to domes-
tic violence cases. Section 1 of the bill amended the Texas Code of
Criminal Procedure to include language in witness' summons inform-
ing the witness that coercion, threats, and retaliatory harm to the wit-
ness are criminal offenses. 133 Further, Section 3 requires trial courts
to give priority docket settings to criminal actions involving family vi-
128. Id.
129. Id. at 75. During a survey to discuss the new change in Texas law, this author
discovered married victims of spousal assaults experience the same sense of relief
when the decision to testify rests with the court rather than the victim. See Seymore,
supra note 12. Battered women were asked about a pending change in Texas law to
create a spousal violence exception to the spousal immunity privilege. Almost all the
women stated that they felt the new rule was a good idea. and all stated that they
would tell the truth if they did testify. Id. While some commentators express concern
that compelling a victim's testimony undermines battered women's attempts at em-
powerment, see, e.g., Legal Responses to Domestic Violence, supra note 5, at 1541,
several interviewees considered it liberating that the state was removing the choice
from them. Seymore, supra note 12, at 846-48. Their responses are consistent with
other commentators who believe victims are empowered by seeing their abusers pros-
ecuted. Cf. Angela West, Prosecutorial Activism: Confronting Heterosexism in a Les-
bian Battering Case, 15 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 249, 255 (1992) ("I believe that the
victim is empowered by seeing the defendant prosecuted.... Seeing the abuser in a
position of social disapproval may be the first step toward realizing that there is help
available . . ").
130. SENATE REPORT, supra note 117, at 75.
131. Id.
132. Act of May 11, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 67, § 2, 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 446, 446
(codified as TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.10 (West 1995)).
133. Id. § 1.
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olence. 134 Last, Section 4 relates to domestic violence training for
prosecuting attorneys. 135 The Texas House readily passed the bill, and
the new spousal immunity provision became effective September 1,
1995, giving the state the power to compel testimony in cases where
one spouse is charged with a crime against the person of the other
spouse. 136
Texas courts now have an opportunity to write on a clean slate
when interpreting the spousal crime exception to spousal immunity.
Although Texas previously had a spousal crime exception, article
38.10 is a new legislative enactment. Thus, prior Texas case authority
is not necessarily helpful in interpreting the new statute. Texas may,
however, look to other states in deciding how best to apply the new
statute.
IV. LESSONS FROM OTHER STATES
The language of spousal crime exceptions, structured in terms of
crimes against a spouse, has posed problems in other jurisdictions in a
number of common situations. For example, in a case where the hus-
band shoots his wife and another man, does the privilege apply to the
wife's testimony in the trial for shooting the other man? Does the
privilege apply in a case where the husband is charged with an offense
other than assault, such as disorderly conduct, when the charge arises
out of an incident of spousal violence? Is violation of a domestic vio-
lence protective order a crime against the spouse when the violation
falls short of assault? Does the privilege apply to crimes where one
spouse victimizes the other in some way other than a crime of vio-
lence? Texas will inevitably confront these problems when interpret-
ing its new spousal crime exception.
A. Brief Overview of Spousal Crime Exceptions in Other States
1. States With No Spousal Immunity
A number of states have no spousal immunity statute.137 In most of
these states, the common law doctrine of spousal incompetency was in
134. Id. § 3, at 446-47.
135. Id. § 4, at 447.
136. Id. § 8.
Passed the Senate on March 13, 1995: Yeas 28, Nays 1; April 19, 1995, Senate
refused to concur in House amendments and requested appointment of Con-
ference Committee; April 21, 1995, House granted request of the Senate;
April 27, 1995, Senate adopted Conference Committee Report by the fol-
lowing vote: Yeas 31, Nays 0; passed the House, with amendments, on April
12, 1995, by a non-record vote; April 21, 1995, House granted request of the
Senate for appointment of Conference Committee; May 1, 1995, House
adopted Conference Committee Report by a non-record vote.
Id.
137. Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Indiana, Kansas, Maine, New Hampshire, New
Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Ver-
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force until a confidential communications privilege was adopted.
Once the communications privilege was in place, the prevailing notion
became that it was sufficient to merely protect the confidentiality of
communications, and the common law doctrine was abrogated.
In a state with no spousal immunity doctrine, a spouse is a compe-
tent and compellable witness in all criminal proceedings. The only
remaining question is to what extent the spouse can reveal confiden-
tial marital communications on the witness stand. A number of states
have included a statutory spousal violence exception to the confiden-
tial communications privilege, 138 or created one by judicial action. 139
2. States With No Spousal Crime Exception
Prior to the September 1, 1995, enactment, Texas belonged in this
category. Now, only Missouri,14 ° the District of Columbia, 4' Geor-
gia, 142 Louisiana,143 Massachusetts,'" and Alabama 45 have no
mont and Wisconsin do not have a spousal immunity privilege. All, however, preserve
the spousal communications privilege. See ARK. R. EVID. 501, 504; DEL. R. EVID.
504; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.504 (West 1979); id. § 914.07 (West 1985); IND. CODE ANN.§ 34-1-14-5 (Burns 1986); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-407, 60-423 (1994); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 15, § 1315 (West 1980); ME. R. EvID. 504; N.H. R. EvID. 504; N.M. R. EvID.
11-501, 11-505; N.Y. CiV. PRAC. L. & R. 4502, 4512 (McKinney 1992); N.Y. CRIM.
PROc. LAW § 60.10 (McKinney 1992); N.D. R. EvID. 501, 504; OKLA. STAT. tit. 12,
§§ 2501, 2504 (1993); Act of June 7, 1995, 1995 S.C. Acts 104 (amending S.C. CODE
ANN. § 19-11-30 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994)); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 19-13-12
to -15 (1995); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1605 (1973); VT. R. EVID. 504: Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 905.05 (West 1993).
138. See infra text accompanying notes 209-12.
139. See, e.g., State v. Klindt, 389 N.W.2d 670, 675-76 (Iowa 1986). Iowa's spousal
immunity statute included a spousal violence exception. IOWA CODE § 622.7 (1983)
(repealed by 1983 Iowa Acts ch. 37, § 7). The confidential communications statute
contained no spousal violence exception. IOWA CODE § 622.9 (1950). Noting a literal
interpretation of the communications privilege in many cases forbids an inquiry into
the personal wrongs committed by one spouse against the other, the Klindt court cre-
ated a spousal violence exception. Klindt, 389 N.W.2d at 676. See also People v.
McCormack, 104 N.Y.S.2d 139, 145 (1951); State v. Moxley, 491 P.2d 1326, 1329
(Wash. 1971).
140. Missouri's privilege reads in pertinent part:
No person shall be incompetent to testify as a witness in any criminal cause
or prosecution ... by reason of being the husband or wife of the accused...
provided, that ... [no] wife or husband of [a person on trial], shall be re-
quired to testify, but any such person may testify at his or her option either
on behalf of or against the defendant ....
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 546.260 (1987).
141. The District of Columbia statute reads as follows: "In civil and criminal pro-
ceedings, a husband or his wife is competent but not compellable to testify for or
against the other." D.C. CODE ANN. § 14-306(a) (1981).
142. "Husband and wife shall be competent but shall not be compellable to give
evidence in any criminal proceeding for or against each other." GA. CODE ANN. § 24-
9-23(a) (1987).
143. Louisiana provides "[i]n a criminal case ... a witness spouse has a privilege
not to testify against the other spouse." LA. CODE EVID. ANN. 505 (West 1995).
144. The Massachusetts statute reads as follows:
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spousal crime exception to the spousal immunity privilege. In these
jurisdictions, an abused wife may testify voluntarily against her hus-
band, even over his objection, but she cannot be compelled to tes-
tify.' 4 6 These jurisdictions contend the spousal crime exception is
unnecessary when the wife has the right to testify voluntarily.
147
3. States With a Spousal Violence Exception
A majority of states recognize an exception to the spousal immunity
privilege when one spouse perpetrates violence upon the other.148 For
example, in Maryland, an exception exists when one spouse commits
"assault and battery" against the other,'149 and in Connecticut the ex-
ception applies when a spouse "receive[s] personal violence from the
other."' 5 ° In other jurisdictions, the language is more ambiguous.
Ohio's spousal immunity statute reads "[e]very person is competent to
Any person ... may testify in any proceeding, civil or criminal... except as
follows:
... [e]xcept as otherwise provided in [child neglect statutes] and
except in any proceeding relating to child abuse, including incest,
neither husband nor wife shall be compelled to testify in the trial of
an indictment, complaint or other criminal proceeding against the
other ....
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 233, § 20 (Law. Co-op. 1986).
145. ALA. CODE § 12-21-227 (1986).
146. See e.g., DeBardeleben v. State, 77 So. 979, 980 (Ala. 1918).
147. See, e.g., State v. Taylor, 642 So.2d 160, 164-65 (La. 1994).
148. See ALASKA R. EVID. 505(a)(2)(D)(i); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4062
(1989); CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 972, 985 (West 1995); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-90-
107(1)(a)(I) (1989); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-84a (West 1994); HAW. R. EVID.
505; IDAHO CODE § 9-203 (1990); IDAHO R. EVID. 504 (d)(2)(A); ILL. REV. STAT.
125/6 § 6 (1993); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 622.8, .9 (West 1950); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &
JUD. PROC. § 9-106 (1995); MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 600.2162(1) (West 1995);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02(1)(a) (West Supp. 1995); Miss. CODE ANN. § 13-1-5
(Supp. 1995); Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-21-19 (1994); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-16-212
(1991); NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-505(3)(a) (1989); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-17(2)(b)
(West 1994); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-57(b)(2) (1986); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.42
(Anderson 1994); OHIO REV. EvID. ANN. § 2945.42 (Anderson 1995); OHIO R. EVID.
601; OR. REV. STAT. § 40.255 (1993); 42 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. § 5913(2) (Supp.
1995); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-17-10.1 (1994); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-24-8(1)(b)(ii)
(1992); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-271.2(i) (Michie 1995); Act of May 5, 1995, ch. 240,
1995 Wash. Legis. Serv. 240 (West) (amending WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 5.60.060(1)
(West 1995)); W. VA. CODE § 57-3-3 (1966); Wyo. STAT. § 1-12-104 (1988). At least
one jurisdiction reads the violence exception to require intentional harm to the
spouse. See Commonwealth v. Dungan, 539 A.2d 817 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988). In Dun-
gan, the husband was driving while intoxicated and caused an accident in which five
people were killed. His wife, a passenger in his vehicle, was seriously injured. The
Dungan court held the wife was not a competent witness: "We believe the statute was
not enacted to apply to the facts of this case... but instead are persuaded the excep-
tion ... was designed to protect those spouses victimized by an act of intentional
violence committed upon them by an accused spouse." Id. at 824.
149. MD. CODE ANN., CTs. & JUD. PRO. § 9-106 (1995).
150. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-84a (West 1994). See also IDAHO CODE § 9-203
(1990) ("a crime committed by violence of one against the person of the other"); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 8-57 (1986) ("assaulting or communicating a threat to the other
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be a witness except ... [a] spouse testifying against the other spouse
charged with a crime except... crime[s] against the testifying spouse or
the children of either . "151 These statutes appear broad enough to
deal with any number of crimes where a spouse is victimized. How-
ever, some jurisdictions interpret statutes using such language as lim-
ited to cases involving personal violence committed by one spouse
against the other.
4. States With a Spousal Crime Exception
Some states have created exceptions to the spousal privilege for
other crimes against the testifying spouse. 152 Some jurisdictions inter-
pret statutes using the language "crime against the other" to include
certain property crimes. For example, under similar statutory lan-
guage, Washington overruled a line of cases requiring personal vio-
lence to apply the exception to burglary of the wife's residence. 53
Arson also frequently falls within this "crime against the spouse" lan-
guage, particularly if the wife was on the premises at the time of the
fire.154
spouse"); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5913 (Supp. 1995) ("criminal proceeding against
either for bodily injury or violence attempted, done or threatened upon the other").
151. OHIo R. EvID. 601 (emphasis added).
152. See ALASKA R. Evw. 505(a)(2)(D)(i); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4062
(1989); CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 972, 985 (West 1995); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-90-
107(a)(a)(I) (1989); HAW. R. EvID. 505; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 725, para. 125-6 § 6
(Smith-Hurd 1992) (formerly ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 155-1 § 6 (Smith-Hurd
1990)); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 622.8, .9 (West 1950); Ky. R. EVID. 504(c)(2)(A); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 27-505(3)(a) (1989); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-17(2)(b) (West 1994);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-57(b)(2) (1994); OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.42 (Anderson
1993); OHIo R. EVID. 601; OR. REV. STAT. § 40.255 (1988); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-
24-8(1)(b)(ii) (1992); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-271.2(i) (Michie 1995): WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 5.60.060(1) (West 1995); W. VA. CODE § 57-3-3 (1966); WYO. STAT. § 1-
12-104 (1988).
153. State v. Thornton, 835 P.2d 216, 217-18 (Wash. 1992) (en banc). Thornton
entered his wife's home while she was at work by breaking a window to gain entry.
Id. at 217. Thornton proceeded to slash his wife's waterbed with a butcher knife and
steal her suitcase. Id. See also State v. Kilponen, 737 P.2d 1024, 1026-27 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1987) (The exception applies where husband broke into wife's residence in-
tending to tie her up and make her watch him commit suicide with the rifle he had
with him because he attempted a crime of personal violence against his wife - unlaw-
ful imprisonment.).
154. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. John, 596 A.2d 834, 837 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (ar-
son where wife was in the building constituted attempted violence against her); Peo-
ple v. Butler, 424 N.W.2d 264, 267 (Mich. 1988) (arson where husband set fire to
wife's apartment); State v. Johnson, 621 P.2d 992, 993 (Kan. 1981) (arson where hus-
band set fire to residence of another where he knew wife was residing); State v.
Moxley, 491 P.2d 1326, 1328 (Wash. Ct. App. 1972) (arson where wife and child were
in the residence).
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B. Common Problems in Applying Spousal Crime Exceptions
1. Crimes Involving Spouse and Nonspouse Victims
In People v. Love,'155 Abner Love accused his estranged wife, Sue,
of "fooling around" with a co-worker, Johnny McQueen. He called
McQueen over to his wife's house to discuss the relationship with Sue
Love. As the three sat in McQueen's car, Abner Love shot McQueen
at close range in the temple. He then pushed McQueen's body out of
the car, took the driver's seat, pointed the gun in his wife's direction,
and threatened to harm her if she tried to leave. Love was charged
with murder in the death of McQueen and with the kidnapping of his
wife.156 The Michigan spousal immunity statute included a spousal vi-
olence exception with the following language: "A husband shall not
be examined as a witness for or against his wife without her consent;
or a wife for or against her husband without his consent, except. .. in
a cause of action that grows out of a personal wrong or injury done by
one to the other.' 1 57 Consequently, a majority of the Michigan court
held Sue Love's testimony was admissible in the kidnapping prosecu-
tion. The court further held Mrs. Love's husband could assert the
spousal privilege to prevent his wife from testifying in the murder
case.158 Rather than viewing the murder of Sue Love's supposed boy-
friend and her kidnapping as one continuous act of spousal violence,
the court held killing McQueen in Sue Love's presence was not a
''personal wrong or injury done by one [spouse] to the other" within
the meaning of the statute. 159 This narrow interpretation of spousal
155. 391 N.W.2d 738, 740 (Mich. 1986).
156. Id. at 739.
157. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2162 (West 1986) (prior to amendment by 1994
MICH. PUB. Acrs 67). The Michigan statute also includes exceptions for criminal
prosecution of a crime committed against the children of either or both, for suits for
divorce, and for criminal prosecution of bigamy. Id. The Michigan courts interpret
the personal wrong or injury language very narrowly. The Supreme Court of Michi-
gan held bigamy is not included within the statutory definition of "personal injury":
The language of the rule at common law was as broad as the language 'per-
sonal injury' in our statute, and that language meant, and was held to mean,
violence, either actual or constructive, to the person.... [T]he wife was not
allowed to give testimony in ... any ... crime not involving personal vio-
lence or corporeal injury to her .... A cause of action growing out of a
personal wrong is one designed to protect or secure some individual right.
The right, as well as the wrong, must pertain to the person. It must be one
that is purely personal in its character, and in no sense can the exception
here be said to embrace public wrongs, which are personal only in the sense
that they wound the feelings or annoy or humiliate, but inflict no injury upon
the person.
People v. Quanstrom, 53 N.W. 165, 166 (Mich. 1892). In response, the Michigan Leg-
islature amended the spousal privilege statute to except bigamy prosecutions. 1897
Mich. Pub. Acts 212. See Love, 391 N.W.2d at 743.
158. Love, 391 N.W.2d at 745.
159. Id. at 743. The court noted some jurisdictions hold otherwise. Id. at 744 (cit-
ing John A. Glenn, Annotation, Competency of One Spouse to Testify Against Other
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violence fails to recognize commonly recurring patterns in battering
relationships - the batterer's threats and assaults against men he be-
lieves are having affairs with his wife.160
Texas has taken the same position as the Love court when interpret-
ing the spousal crime exception embodied in former article 38.11,
which provided each spouse "may voluntarily testify against each
other in any case for an offense involving any grade of assault or vio-
lence committed by one against the other."' 1 In Young v. State, 62 the
defendant drove his car into a car occupied by his wife, her brother,
and another man. Mrs. Young was injured in the deliberate collision,
and went to the hospital as a result. Young was indicted for aggra-
vated assault of Tommy Gould, his wife's brother.163 The court held
the spousal violence exception did not apply because the wife was not
the injured party in the case being tried. 164 The Young court stated:
What must be looked to here is not the "involving" feature of the
statute; certainly the instant offense involved an assault [because]
appellant drove his automobile into a smaller car and thereby...
did "threaten imminent bodily injury to Tommy Lee Gould," an oc-
cupant of the car along with wife of appellant .... Plainly and
simply, this is not a "case for an offense ... committed by one
[spouse] against the other." Rather it is a case for an offense alleg-
edly committed by appellant against Gould.' 65
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reached a similar conclusion
six years later in Willard v. State.1 66 In Willard, Mrs. Willard filed for
divorce. She and her adult daughter, Lynn, went to Mr. Willard's
home to retrieve some of Mrs. Willard's belongings. Mrs. Willard tes-
in Prosecution for Offense Against Third Party as Affected by Fact that Offense Against
Spouse was Involved in Same Transaction, 36 A.L.R.3d 820 (1971)).
160. See supra text accompanying notes 28-31.
161. See supra text accompanying note 100.
162. 603 S.W.2d 851 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980).
163. Id. at 851.
164. Id. at 852.
165. Id. at 853 (alteration in original). The prosecution argued the crime involved
any grade of assault or violence by one spouse against the other spouse, and the stat-
ute should apply when facts and circumstances showed such an assault regardless of
the allegations in the charging instrument. As authority, the State relied on Garcia v.
State, 573 S.W.2d 12 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1978). Garcia dealt with the provi-
sion in article 38.11 which allows a wife to testify when the offense is against a minor
child. Id. at 15. In Garcia, the court held that whether the offense against the minor
child "involves any grade of assault" is to be determined by reference to the underly-
ing facts and circumstances, not by reference to the charging instrument. Id. The
defendant was charged with indecency with a child, and the court looked to the facts
and circumstances in determining the crime involved assault. Id.
166. 719 S.W.2d 595 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (en banc). See also Velasquez v. State,
727 S.W.2d 580, 581 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (en banc) (per curiam) (disqualifying a
wife from testifying because the exception does not apply where the husband ap-
proached the wife and another man sitting together in car, shot the man "around six
times" in the head, shot the wife in the hip, and was charged with murder of the other
man). Id.
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tified that while they were at Mr. Willard's house, Mr. Willard hit her
and Lynn with his fists, then got a gun and shot Lynn. Mr. Willard
thereafter forced Mrs. Willard to accompany him as he left the prem-
ises, threatening to kill her if she did not go to Mexico with him. Mrs.
Willard was released later that night. Mr. Willard was charged with
murder and convicted in the shooting death of Lynn. Mrs. Willard
testified in the murder trial and the appellate court reversed, holding
the spousal crime exception did not apply since Mrs. Willard was not
the victim in the charged offense. 167 Judge White dissented in Willard,
arguing the exception should apply in a case where a defendant vio-
lently assaults his wife and her adult daughter during the same course
of conduct. 168
Other jurisdictions interpret their spousal violence exceptions
broadly enough to include crimes committed by husbands against
third persons, so long as the wife was victimized in the same transac-
tion. 69 In State v. Mowery, 7' the defendant broke into the house of
Harley Laughlin, where Laughlin and Mowery's estranged wife were
sleeping. Mowery shot Laughlin and Mrs. Mowery five times. Laugh-
lin was killed, but Mrs. Mowery survived, although severely injured.
Mowery was charged with aggravated burglary, aggravated murder of
Laughlin, and attempted murder of his wife. 7' The three charges
were tried together, and the trial court allowed Mrs. Mowery to testify
to the burglary of Laughlin's residence and Laughlin's murder, as well
as to her husband's attempt to murder her. On appeal, the Ohio
Supreme Court held Mrs. Mowery was competent to testify in all
three charges. 172 The statute interpreted by the Ohio Supreme Court
167. Willard, 719 S.W.2d at 598. The court noted, however, Rule 504 of the Texas
Rules of Criminal Evidence was adopted after the trial of the case at,bar, and under
that rule, Mrs. Willard could choose to testify. Id. at 600. The court further noted
"[i]n the event of retrial the wife may be permitted to testify under said Rule 504."
Id. at 601.
168. Id. at 601. (White, J., dissenting).
169. Some states explicitly provide in their spousal privilege statutes that the privi-
lege may not be claimed in a criminal proceeding where a spouse is charged with a
crime against a third person committed in the course of a crime against the other
spouse. See HAW. R. EvID. 505(c)(1)(D); OR. REV. STAT. § 40.255(4)(a) (1993); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 905.05(3)(b) (West 1993). Other jurisdictions have achieved the same
result through judicial construction. See, e.g., State v. Briley, 251 A.2d 442 (N.J.
1969); State v. Bleeker, 327 N.W.2d 728 (Iowa 1982); People v. McGregor, 635 P.2d
912 (Colo. Ct. App. 1981); State v. Thompson, 564 P.2d 315 (Wash. 1977).
170. 438 N.E.2d 897 (Ohio 1982).
171. Id. at 898.
172. The court reasoned as follows:
It is undisputed Mrs. Mowery was competent to testify as to the three shots
fired by appellee at her which resulted in the attempted murder charge.
Once it is established Mrs. Mowery is competent to testify as to the second,
fourth and fifth shots fired by the appellee, it would be ludicrous to fabricate
a justification for excluding Mrs. Mowery's testimony about the first and
third shots, or the mechanics of appellee's entrance into the Laughlin resi-
dence. These three crimes constitute one continuous transaction or happen-
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in Mowery, like the Texas statute, provides an exception to the privi-
lege where a defendant spouse is charged with crimes against the testi-
fying spouse. 173
In State v. Briley,174 a New Jersey court reached a similar result in-
terpreting another Texas-like statute. The New Jersey statute pro-
vided: "The spouse of the accused in a criminal action shall not testify
in such action ... unless ... the accused is charged with an offense
against the spouse .... 175 In Briley, John Lee Briley was charged
with the murder of Benjamin Reaves, Jr., and with the commission of
an atrocious assault and battery upon Mrs. Briley, both offenses aris-
ing out of a single event. 176 Noting "[p]rivileges which enable a per-
son to prevent another from testifying against him ... are obstacles in
the path of the normal trial objective of a search for ultimate truth,"
the court reasoned these privileges should be construed and applied
so as to accommodate justice.177 The court opined, "[W]hen a greater
public interest is served by recognizing the competency of one spouse
to testify against the other and no violence is done to the privilege as
expressed in a statutory or judicial rule of evidence, the testimony
ing culminating in offenses against two individuals. The three offenses were
not well-defined and separate, but rather, were overlapping and intertwined.
Any attempt to extricate testimony from Mrs. Mowery relating only to the
attempted murder charge would be highly artificial in view of the instant
facts.
Id. at 900.
173. OHIo R. EVID. 601(B).
174. 251 A.2d 442 (N.J. 1969).
175. N.J. R. EvID. 23(2).
176. Briley, 251 A.2d at 443. The court described the facts as follows:
When this criminal event occurred on November 6, 1966, defendant, age 28,
and Paulette, age 18, had been married for three years. Their marriage was
stormy; he was suspicious of her fidelity although his own constancy appar-
ently left much to be desired. On Thursday November 3 they quarreled be-
cause defendant found his wife and Reaves embracing. She then left their
home with her baby and stayed for the next three nights at the Rainbow
Motel ....
On Sunday morning, November 6, Reaves came to the motel and picked
up Mrs. Briley and the baby. They got into his car and Reaves was about to
start it when Briley, who had been looking for his wife, observed them. Ac-
cording to Mrs. Briley he ran toward the car, armed with a shotgun, part of
the stock and barrel of which had been sawed off .... [T]he gun was dis-
charged, and Reaves died shortly thereafter from a gunshot wound in the
abdomen.
Mrs. Briley put her baby on the seat of the car, got out of the passenger
side and started to run down the road. Briley pursued, intending to hit her
because she had gone to the motel with Reaves. She tripped and fell and he
overtook her as she lay on the ground. He was still carrying the shotgun
which was then empty. Apparently while asking what she was doing at the
motel "with that man," he struck at her with the gun, causing the injuries
which resulted in the indictment for atrocious assault and battery.
Id. at 444.
177. Id. at 446.
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should be received." '178 The Briley court believed the language of the
statute, when sensibly construed, did not restrict the testimony of the
wife to cases in which she alone was the victim of her husband's
crime.' 79 Thus, the court held:
If there is a single criminal event in which she and others are targets
or victims of the husband's criminal conduct in the totality of the
integrated incident and formal charges are made against the hus-
band for some or all the offenses committed (one of which charges
is for an offense against the spouse), the wife should be a competent
and compellable witness against her husband at the trial of all the
cases regardless of whether they are tried separately or in one pro-
ceeding. And, in this connection, it should be immaterial that the
offense against the wife does not reach the same dimensions of
criminality as it does against the third-party victim.' 80
A number of other jurisdictions have ruled in accord with the
Mowery and Briley courts, holding a victim spouse can testify where
the defendant spouse has committed offenses against her and others in
the same criminal transaction.1 8' For example, in State v. Thomp-
son, 82 a Washington court held that a wife is a competent and com-
pellable witness at the trial of all the cases arising from the same
criminal transaction, regardless of whether the cases are tried sepa-
rately or together.1 83 The Thompson court interpreted broadly the
requirement that the offense against the non-spouse must arise from
the same criminal transaction in which the other spouse is injured.
In Thompson, the defendant was charged with the murder of Jan
Cygan, as well as assault on Mrs. Thompson.184 Mrs. Thompson testi-
fied she came home around 5 p.m. to find Thompson and some friends
there. After the friends left, Thompson accused her of adultery with
Cygan. At first Mrs. Thompson denied the adultery, but later she ad-
mitted her infidelity when Thompson threatened to torture her. The
defendant then hit her in the face, causing her nose to bleed, and hit
her across the legs with a rubber hose. 85 Cygan, who had been living
at the Thompsons' house, returned home about 8:30 the same eve-
ning. Thompson tied him to a set of metal bed springs and beat him
with the rubber hose. The Thompsons left the house around 10 p.m.,
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. People v. Vieau, 357 N.W.2d 736, 738 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984); State v. Thomp-
son, 564 P.2d 315, 318 (Wash. 1977) (en banc); State v. Bleeker, 327 N.W.2d 728, 731(Iowa 1982); State v. Crow, 457 P.2d 256, 263 (Ariz. 1969) (en banc); cf. Fortes v.
Sacramento Mun. Court Dist., 170 Cal. Rptr. 292, 293-94 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) (Cali-
fornia statute provided explicitly for an exception when a crime is committed against
another in the course of committing a crime against the spouse).
182. 564 P.2d 315 (Wash. 1977) (en banc).
183. Id. at 318.
184. Id. at 316.
185. Id.
[Vol. 2
SPOUSAL PRIVILEGE
leaving Cygan tied to the bed springs.186 When they returned at 1
a.m., Mrs. Thompson saw Cygan lift his head from where he was tied
to the bed. She later saw Thompson carrying Cygan in a sleeping bag
out of the house, and she heard Cygan moan when Thompson hit
Cygan's head against the door frame. 187 Thompson returned home
around 7 a.m., covered with dirt. He told his wife that he killed
Cygan.188 Cygan's body was later found buried in a shallow grave,
wrapped in a sleeping bag, with his hands and feet bound. 189
The court rejected Thompson's argument that the assault on his
wife and the murder of Cygan did not arise out of the same transac-
tion. The court reasoned:
Both the assault upon Mrs. Thompson and the murder of Jan Cygan
apparently stemmed from defendant's discovery of his wife's infi-
delity. Although he may have suspected her marital misconduct
before [the date of the offense], it was then that she admitted the
same. And while there was some passage of time between the as-
sault and the murder, the logical relationship of the crimes is more
important than any immediateness of connection in time in this
case.
19o
Thus, the Thompson court held that Mrs. Thompson could testify in
the murder case as well as in the assault case.
Both Briley and Thompson make clear that for the exception to
apply in cases involving both spouse and non-spouse victims, a de-
fendant spouse must be charged with an offense against the victim
spouse.' 91 At least one California court explored the question of the
bona fide nature of the charge involving a victim spouse.192 That case
involved the California privilege rule, which explicitly provides that
the privilege is inapplicable when a defendant spouse is charged with
"[a] crime against the person or property of a third person committed
in the course of committing a crime against the person or property of
the other spouse ....
In Fortes v. Sacramento Municipal Court Dist.,194 Paul Fortes en-
tered his wife's residence, shooting and killing a male visitor. Paul
was charged with burglary of his wife's abode and with murder. The
prosecution contended the spousal privilege was inapplicable because
Paul committed the murder in the course of committing a property
186. Id. at 317.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 316.
190. Id. at 318.
191. State v. Briley, 251 A.2d 442, 446 (N.J. 1969); State v. Thompson, 564 P.2d 315,
318 (Wash. 1977) (en banc).
192. Fortes v. Sacramento Mun. Court Dist., 170 Cal. Rptr. 292 (Cal. Ct. App.
1980).
193. CAL. EVID. CODE § 972(e)(2) (West 1995).
194. 170 Cal. Rptr. 292 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980).
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offense (burglary) against his wife, Sharon. 195 There was some ques-
tion, however, of the legitimacy of the burglary charge. Paul and
Sharon Fortes lived together in the home until three weeks prior to
the burglary. Paul left voluntarily, and Sharon filed for divorce, ob-
taining a temporary restraining order barring Paul from the residence.
However, the restraining order expired by its terms two days before
the burglary and murder.196 At trial, the magistrate held that notwith-
standing the fact he would not make Paul answer for the burglary of
his own family dwelling,197 the exception to the privilege applied on
the "concededly literal" ground that the defendant was "charged with
burglary."198
The appellate court reversed, holding that where the factual or legal
basis of an exception to a privilege has been put in issue, the prosecu-
tion must make at least "a prima facie showing of violation of the
offense or offenses giving rise to the exception."' 99 Because the pros-
ecution failed to show Paul could validly be convicted of burglarizing
his residence, the exception to the privilege did not apply.2 00
2. Crimes Other Than Assaults or Violence
The phrase domestic violence usually calls to mind beatings - typi-
cally, a husband beating his wife.2 ' Nevertheless, domestic violence
may encompass conduct other than assaultive behavior.2 °2 From a
brief review of case law, stories can be extracted of abusive spouses
who commit burglary, arson, theft, forgery, disturbing the peace, or
stalking. Consider, for example, the case of Robert Thornton.2 °a
Thornton broke into his estranged wife's home, slashed her waterbed
with a butcher knife, and stole her suitcase. In another case, Wesley
Moxley set fire to his estranged wife's home after threatening to kill
her.2°4 In some jurisdictions, it is questionable whether these inci-
195. Id. at 293.
196. Id.
197. In a 1975 case, the California Supreme Court held an individual cannot com-
mit burglary in his own home. People v. Gauze, 542 P.2d 1365, 1367 (Cal. 1975). An
earlier case decided by the same court was distinguished because the defendant
spouse did not have the right to enter his wife's house without her permission. People
v. Sears, 401 P.2d 938, 944 (Cal. 1965).
198. Fortes, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 293.
199. Id. at 296.
200. Id. at 297.
201. See, e.g., UNDER THE RULE OF THUMB: BATTERED WOMEN AND THE ADMIN-
ISTRATION OF JUSTICE, REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL
RIGHTS (1982), noting states typically define domestic violence or domestic abuse as
"causing or attempting to cause bodily injury or serious bodily injury," "physical in-jury, sexual abuse or forced imprisonment." Id. at 5.
202. See supra text accompanying notes 28-31 concerning abusive spouses' typical
controlling behaviors,
203. State v. Thornton, 835 P.2d 216 (Wash. 1992) (en banc).
204. State v. Moxley, 491 P.2d 1326 (Wash. Ct. App. 1971).
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dents are "crimes against a spouse" so as to allow a victim wife's
testimony.
Under Texas' former spousal crime exceptions, property crimes,
such as when a husband stole his wife's mule, 0 5 or nonviolent offenses
against a wife, such as slander,206 bigamy, 0 7 or adultery,2 8 were not
included within the spousal crime exception. The modern trend, how-
ever, is to include more causes of action under the crimes against a
spouse umbrella. For example, in Michigan v. Butler,2 °9 the Michigan
Supreme Court distinguished prior authority in order to bring arson
within its exception, requiring that "the cause of action grow[ ] out of
a personal wrong or injury done by one [spouse] to the other. 2 1 0
In Butler, the lower court held the victim "could testify against [the]
defendant only if the cause of action arises from a wrong which is
purely personal in character, in no sense embracing a public
wrong." '211 The intermediate appellate court concluded arson was not
a wrong purely personal in character.212 The Michigan Supreme
Court rejected the lower court's interpretation as "illogical and unrea-
sonable. '213 The Butler court reasoned that setting fire to a person's
residence places the person in great danger and threatens or destroys
personal property. "Other than a physical beating directly inflicted
upon a victim, it is difficult to imagine anything that would more
clearly be a 'personal wrong or injury.' 2 14
205. Overton v. State, 43 Tex. 616 (1875).
206. Baxter v. State, 31 S.W. 394 (Tex. Crim. App. 1895).
207. Boyd v. State, 26 S.W. 1080 (Tex. Crim. App. 1894).
208. McLean v. State, 24 S.W. 898 (Tex. Crim. App. 1894).
209. 424 N.W.2d 264 (Mich. 1988) (per curiam).
210. Id. at 264 (quoting MicH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 600.2162 (West 1986)) (second
alteration in original).
211. People v. Butler, 408 N.W.2d 532, 535 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987). The court relied
on People v. Love, 391 N.W.2d 738 (Mich. 1986), and People v. Quanstrom, 53 N.W.
165 (Mich. 1892). See supra notes 155-60 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the Love case.
212. Butler, 408 N.W.2d at 535. The Michigan Court of Appeals explained:
It is plain that the [arson] statute means to prevent not the injury of others
nor the destruction of the property of others, but the public wrong of burn-
ing any dwelling house, any time, anywhere for any reason. This is not a
cause of action "designed to protect or secure some individual right," nor to
prevent "personal violence or corporeal injury" to any person.
The cause of action was arson of a dwelling house, which is a public
wrong.
Under the terms of the statute, therefore, as interpreted by both Love and
Quanstrom, the exception does not apply in this case, and the privilege
stands.
Id.
213. Id. at 266.
214. Butler, 424 N.W.2d at 267. For courts reaching a similar result, see State v.
Moxley, 491 P.2d 1326, 1329 (Wash. Ct. App. 1971); Commonwealth v. John, 596 A.2d
834 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991); Peters v. District Ct. of Iowa, 183 N.W.2d 209, 212 (Iowa
1971); but see Creech v. Commonwealth, 410 S.E.2d 650 (Va. 1991). Creech
threatened to "torch" his wife's belongings when she told him she was leaving him.
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Washington has taken similar steps in overruling prior authority to
bring burglary within the crime exception.2 15 As the Washington
Supreme Court noted, the Washington statute excepted the spousal
privilege from "a criminal action or proceeding for a crime committed
by one [spouse] against the other." 216 The Thornton court reasoned
that under the plain language of the statute, the privilege does not
apply because the burglary victim was the defendant's spouse. 17 The
court noted, however, that earlier courts had interpreted the statute to
apply only in cases where the charged offense was a crime of personal
violence by one spouse against the other.218 The court viewed these
interpretations to be contrary to the plain meaning of the statutory
enactment, which does not limit the exception to crimes of violence.
As a judge-created engraftment to the statute, the court determined it
had authority to overrule precedent.2 19
V. SPOUSAL CRIME EXCEPTION TO COMMUNICATIONS PRIVILEGE
Texas has a communications privilege as well as a spousal immunity
privilege. The communications privilege reads, in pertinent part:
(b) General Rule of Privilege. A person.., has a privilege during
... marriage and afterwards to refuse to disclose and to prevent
another from disclosing a confidential communication made to his
spouse while they were married.
(d) Exceptions. There is no privilege under this rule:
(2) In a proceeding in which an accused is charged with a
crime against the person of any minor child or any mem-
ber of the household of either spouse, except in a proceed-
ing where the accused is charged with a crime committed
during the marriage against the spouse.2 20
These exceptions to the communications privilege are identical to the
exceptions to spousal immunity prior to the enactment of article 38.10.
Id. at 651. He set fire to his own house, which contained furniture Mrs. Creech had
brought to the house when she married Creech. Id. The court held "[t]his case lacks
an element essential for invocation of the statutory exception to the general rule of
spousal immunity - prosecution of an offense committed by Creech against Mrs.
Creech." Id. Here, Creech was charged only with burning down his own house, not
with any crime against his wife. Id.
215. State v. Thornton, 835 P.2d 216, 218 (Wash. 1992) (en banc) (holding policy
reasons set out in previous cases are no longer accepted).
216. Id. at 217 (alteration in original) (quoting WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 5.60.060(1) (West 1989) (prior to amendment by 1995 Wash. Legis. Serv. 240
(West))).
217. Id. at 217.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 219 (quoting State v. Thompson, 564 P.2d 315, 322 (Wash. 1977) (Utter,
J., dissenting) (en banc)).
220. TEX. R. CRIM. EVID. 504(1)(b), (d)(2).
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However, the legislative enactment of article 38.10 created a spousal
crime exception only to the spousal immunity privilege in Rule 504.221
The Texas Legislature did not change the communications privilege to
include a "crimes against the spouse" exception.
Communications privileges tend to provide less difficulty in spousal
abuse cases than spousal immunity privileges. Courts generally have
held threats and violence are not communicative, or are not induced
by the confidence incident to marriage, and thus do not come within
the privilege.222 Some jurisdictions have a spousal violence exception
to their confidential communications privilege as well as to their
spousal immunity privilege, thus allowing a wife to testify concerning
confidential communications made during domestic abuse. 2 3
Texas takes the position that assaultive conduct is not a confidential
communication within the meaning of Rule 504. In Sterling v. State,2 4
the defendant's wife testified Sterling struck her with his fists, a tape
recorder, a brick, and a telephone. The court held Rule 504 applies to
"utterances and not to acts, '' 25 and thus, the defendant's abusive
treatment of his wife was not a confidential communication.22 6 This
holding solves most of the problems presented by the communications
privilege in spousal abuse cases. There are, however, a number of
cases in which testimony of utterances as well as acts would be helpful.
Consider, for example, a case in which a defendant spouse is
charged with the attempted murder of his wife. In such a case, the
state must establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
221. Article 38.10 states explicitly "[t]he privilege... not to be called as a witness
... ." TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.10 (West 1995). This cannot be reason-
ably interpreted to apply to anything other than spousal immunity. Further, the title
to the article is "Exceptions to the Spousal Adverse Testimony Privilege." Id. Nor is
there anything in the Senate Committee's Final Report indicating the legislature in-
tended to create an exception to both privileges.
222. See, e.g., People v. Thompson, 314 N.W.2d 606, 610 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981);
State v. Johnson, 586 S.W.2d 437, 441 n.3 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979); Harris v. State, 376
A.2d 1144, 1146 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1977); Morgan v. United States, 363 A.2d 999,
1004 (D.C. 1976); State v. Americk, 256 P.2d 278, 279 (Wash. 1953).
223. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. 125/6 § 6 (1993); LA. CODE EVID. ANN. art. 504
(West 1995).
224. 814 S.W.2d 261, 261 (Tex. App.-Austin 1991, pet. ref'd).
225. Id. The court quoted cases under the 1965 statute for that proposition, noting
"[tlhere is nothing in rule 504(1) to indicate that it was intended to abrogate that
holding ...." Id. at 262. The court also noted "[to] say that the privilege extends
only to 'utterances' is not strictly correct, as the privilege has been applied to letters
and diary entries." Id. at 262 n.1.
226. Id. at 261. See also State v. Mireles, 904 S.W.2d 885, 890 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1995, pet. ref'd) (wife may testify about husband's actions she observed, but
not about husband's statements made to her during marriage); Freeman v. State, 786
S.W.2d 56, 59 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, no pet.) (ex-wife's testimony that
her ex-husband carried weapons with him all the time during their marriage does not
violate the communications privilege).
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specifically intended to cause death. 27 If the defendant beat his wife
with his bare hands, his intention to kill rather than merely injure her
may be ambiguous, or may be difficult to infer from his conduct. 228 It
would be a very different case, however, if the jury could hear that the
defendant was screaming, "I'm going to kill you!" while he pounded
her with his fists.2 29 If the confidential communications privilege is
interpreted so as to prevent the wife's testimony concerning what her
husband said while beating her, some of the worst perpetrators of vio-
lence will not be appropriately punished for their actions.
The Texas Legislature's failure to provide a spousal crime exception
to the confidential communications privilege may well be an over-
sight. If so, the Legislature should consider amending article 38.10 to
extend the exception to the communications privilege.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION
An appropriate spousal immunity statute must 1) allow a spouse's
testimony in the broadest possible circumstances of domestic violence
227. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 15.01, 19.02 (West 1995); Graves v. State, 782
S.W.2d 5, 6 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, writ ref'd) (phrase "with specific intent to com-
mit an offense" in criminal attempt statute means the accused must have intended to
bring about the desired result); see also Flanagan v. State, 675 S.W.2d 734, 741 (Tex.
Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1984, no pet.) (specific intent to kill is necessary element of
attempted murder).
228. Juries typically infer a person's state of mind, for example, intent to cause
death, from his or her conduct. See, e.g., Hernandez v. State, 819 S.W.2d 806, 810
(Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (en banc), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 974 (1992); Moreno v. State,
702 S.W.2d 636, 641 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (en banc); Dues v. State, 634 S.W.2d 304,
305 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1982); Turner v. State, 600 S.W.2d 927, 929 (Tex.
Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980); Beltran v. State, 593 S.W.2d 688, 689 (Tex. Crim. App.
[Panel Op.] 1980); Dillon v. State, 574 S.W.2d 92, 94-95 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.]
1978); Bowles v. State, 550 S.W.2d 84, 85 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977); see also Graves, 782
S.W.2d at 7 (evidence that defendant deliberately aimed and fired gun at complainant
was sufficient to show defendant had specific intent to kill); Godsey v. State, 719
S.W.2d 578, 581 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (en banc) (deadly weapon used in a deadly
manner almost conclusively supports the inference that accused intended to kill);
Berry v. State, 579 S.W.2d 487, 489 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1979) (threats may
be communicated by actions, words, or deeds). Even in cases dealing with the use of
a deadly weapon, courts concede intent can be ambiguous. As the Flanagan court
noted, "Simply because a man shoots at another [with a shotgun] does not necessarily
make it an assault with intent to murder." Flanagan, 675 S.W.2d at 737 (quoting
Cooper v. State, 132 S.W. 355, 356 (Tex. Crim. App. 1910)) (alteration in original).
229. See Castillo v. State, 899 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1995, no pet.); Michel v. State, 834 S.W.2d 64, 67 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, no pet.)
(jury may infer intent from words, acts, and deeds); Branson v. State, 825 S.W.2d 162,
168 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, no pet.); Henderson v. State, 825 S.W.2d 746, 749 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, pet. ref'd); Martinez v. State, 844 S.W.2d 279, 283
(Tex. App.-San Antonio 1992, pet. ref'd); Bartley v. State, 789 S.W.2d 288, 292 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1990, pet. ref'd); Brown v. State, 704 S.W.2d 506, 507 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 1986, pet. ref'd); Ercanbrack v. State, 646 S.W.2d 480, 481 (Tex. App.-Hous-
ton [1st Dist.] 1982, no pet.). Cf Gardner v. State, 736 S.W.2d 179, 182 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 1987), aff'd, 780 S.W.2d 259 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (proof of culpable mental
state may generally rest on circumstantial evidence) (en banc).
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and 2) signify the importance of domestic violence to the state by al-
lowing prosecutors to use all available measures to prosecute wrong-
doers, including compelled spousal testimony.23 ° With the legislative
enactment of article 38.10, Texas now has the opportunity to show that
domestic violence offends the peace and dignity of the state. This op-
portunity will be lost, however, if courts disregard what is commonly
known about battering behavior and ignore the reality of battered wo-
men's lives. Crimes against third parties which are motivated by the
husband's desire to control his wife, as well as manipulative, violent
behavior not rising to the level of physical battering, must be consid-
ered crimes against the spouse and thus within the exception to spousal
immunity.
Because rules of privilege are in derogation of the search for truth,
a basic rule of construction when interpreting rules of privilege is that
they should be interpreted narrowly.231 Narrow application of a privi-
lege requires broad interpretation of the exceptions to the privilege.
The judiciary's responsibility in interpreting a new statute is to effectu-
ate the intent of the legislature.232 In attempting to discern legislative
intent, courts may consider 1) the object sought to be attained, 2) the
circumstances under which the statute was enacted, 3) legislative his-
tory, 4) consequences of a particular construction, and 5) title (cap-
tion), preamble, and emergency provision.233
The evil the Texas Legislature sought to remedy is clear - the diffi-
culty in prosecuting crimes between spouses because of the effect of
the marital privilege. The Senate Committee on Domestic Violence
informed the Legislature in its Final Report that such cases often have
only one witness, the spouse victim, and prosecutors are hampered in
building strong cases because the privilege prevents them from com-
230. Seymore, supra note 12, at 851-52.
231. University of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 189 (1990) (inasmuch as privileges
contravene the fundamental principle that the public "has a right to every man's evi-
dence," any such privilege must "be strictly construed") (quoting Trammel v. United
States, 445 U.S. 40, 50 (1950)); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974);
Lehnhard v. Moore, 401 S.W.2d 232 (Tex. 1966) (trade secret privilege should be
strictly construed because "no man is to be denied the enforcement of his rights
merely because another possesses the facts without which the right cannot be ascer-
tained and enforced") (quoting JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2212, at 156 (Mc-
Naughton rev. 1961)); Wade v. Abdnor, 635 S.W.2d 937, 938 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1982,
no writ) (psychotherapist-patient privilege should be strictly construed because of
limitations on disclosure in judicial proceedings); see also MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK,
supra note 60, § 5.1, at 333 ("[A] privilege should be construed to exclude no more
evidence than is necessary to accomplish the purposes for which it was created.").
232. Patterson v. State, 769 S.W.2d 938, 940 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (en banc); Ca-
macho v. State, 765 S.W.2d 431, 433 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (en banc); see also Lan-
ford v. Fourteenth Court of Appeals, 847 S.W.2d 581, 586 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993)
("[O]ur constitutional duty is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the
legislators who voted for [the statute].").
233. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 311.023 (West 1988); see also State v. Arellano, 801
S.W.2d 128, 131 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1990, no pet.).
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pelling a victim's testimony.234 The Senate Committee held public
hearings, where members of the public and officials of the criminal
justice system testified. The Committee's Final Report makes it clear
that the new law is intended to "relieve the pressures [to drop
charges] placed on the married victim. '2 35 Thus, it appears the Texas
Legislature intended to provide a remedy best designed to "remove
the burden from the victim. '2 36 Interpreting the new statute liberally,
so as to allow the prosecution to compel victim spouses' testimony in
the broadest possible circumstances of domestic violence, best effectu-
ates legislative intent.
The Texas statute does not limit the exception to crimes of violence.
The statute allows the state to compel testimony "in any proceeding in
which the person is charged with a crime committed against the per-
son's spouse. ' 237 The Texas Legislature did not adopt the language
which appeared in the 1965 spousal crime exception, which provided
an exception "in any case for an offense involving any grade of assault
or violence committed by one against the other. 238 Nothing on the
face of the most recent statute indicates the Legislature intended the
exception to apply only to crimes of violence. The rejection of the
assault or violence language of the 1965 exception manifests clear leg-
islative intent not to limit the application of the exception. An exami-
nation of Senate Bill 128, which includes the provision for article
38.10, confirms that the Legislature deliberately used the crime against
the spouse language to avoid limiting the statutory exception to vio-
lent crimes. Senate Bill 128 twice refers to "family violence, as de-
fined by section 71.01, Family Code. '239 Section 71.01 defines "family
violence" as:
an act by a member of a family or household against another mem-
ber of the family or household that is intended to result in physical
harm, bodily injury, assault, or sexual assault or that is a threat that
reasonably places the member in fear of imminent physical harm,
234. SENATE REPORT, supra note 117, at 73.
235. Id. at 74. The Committee further stated, "This provision removes the burden
from the victim and reduces the likelihood that the perpetrator will batter the victim
for pressing charges." Id.
236. Id.
237. TEX. CODE. CRIM. PROc. ANN. art. 38.10 (West 1995).
238. Act of June 18, 1965, 59th Leg., R.S., ch. 722, 1965 Tex. Gen. Laws 317, 467(codified as TEX. CODE CRIM. PRO. ANN. art 38.11 (West 1979) (repealed by Act of
June 14, 1985, 69th Leg., R.S., ch. 685, § 9, 1985 Tex. Gen. Laws 2472, 2474)). This
was Texas' most recent spousal crime exception prior to article 38.10.
239. Act of May 11, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 67, §§ 3-4, 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 446,
446-67. In section three, when referring to priority settings of certain criminal cases,
the bill refers to "criminal actions involving a charge that a person committed an act
of family violence, as defined by Section 71.01, Family Code." Id. § 3. In section four,
the bill requires training of prosecuting attorneys relating to "cases involving a charge
that a person committed an act of family violence as defined by Section 71.01, Family
Code." Id. § 4, at 447.
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bodily injury, assault, or sexual assault, but does not include defen-
sive measures to protect oneself .... c'
Rather than referring to crimes of family violence in article 38.10, the
Legislature chose to use the phrase crime against the spouse. This sug-
gests intent for the privilege exception to extend beyond assaultive
conduct.
Furthermore, where a husband's crime against his wife also involves
an offense against a third party, the new Texas statute does not pre-
clude compelling the victim spouse's testimony in the second case.
The Texas statute is clearly susceptible to the same interpretation as
the New Jersey statute in Briley.241 The Love case is distinguishable
on the ground that, unlike the Texas statute, the Michigan statute re-
quires the crime to originate in a personal wrong or injury committed
by one spouse against the other. Further, the Love court's narrow
interpretation of spousal violence fails to account for commonly recur-
ring patterns in battering relationships. These patterns include fits of
pathological jealousy, and threats and assaults against men who the
batterer believes are his wife's lovers. Moreover, these threats and
assaults often extend to anyone else the batterer believes might inter-
fere with his complete domination over his spouse.
The Texas Legislature clearly intended for courts to read the
spousal crime exception broadly enough to effectuate the legislative
purpose behind the statute, to help combat domestic violence. If a
spouse and a third party are victims of the other spouse's criminal
conduct in the same criminal episode, the victim spouse should be a
competent and compellable witness against the other spouse at the
trial of all the cases. z42 Crimes involving a victim spouse and other
individuals are rarely well-defined and separate, rather, they are over-
lapping and intertwined. As the Ohio court reasoned in Mowery,
"[o]nce it is established [the victim spouse] is competent [and compel-
lable] to testify as to the second, fourth and fifth shots fired by the
240. Act of June 17, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 1024. 1995 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 5095,
5096 (to be codified as an amendment to TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 71.01(a)(2)(A)).
The definition of family violence in section 71.01 includes abuse as defined elsewhere
in the Family Code. Id. That definition, however, refers to abuse of children, not
spouses. See id.
241. State v. Briley, 251 A.2d 442 (N.J. 1969).
242. The notion of the same criminal episode is not foreign in Texas jurisprudence.
A Texas defendant may be prosecuted in a single criminal action for all offenses aris-
ing out of the same criminal episode. TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 3.02 (West 1994).
"Criminal episode" means the commission of two or more offenses, regard-
less of whether the harm is directed toward or inflicted upon more than one
person or item of property, under the following circumstances:
(1) the offenses are committed pursuant to the same transaction or
pursuant to two or more transactions that are connected or consti-
tute a common scheme or plan; or(2) the offenses are the repeated commission of the same or similar
offenses.
Id. § 3.01.
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[defendant spouse], it would be ludicrous to fabricate a justification
for excluding [the victim spouse's] testimony about the first and third
shots ... ,24 Interpreting article 38.10 so as to compel the victim
spouse's testimony in the first incident and except it as to the second
presumes the Texas Legislature intended an absurd result. This inter-
pretation would violate the well-established tenet that courts will not
construe statutes in a manner that produces absurd results. 144
The new Texas statute should be construed to give the state power
to compel a victim spouse's testimony to the same extent the state
may compel the testimony of any other crime victim. Any other inter-
pretation reduces the importance of domestic violence by treating it as
a species of tort rather than crime. As Ann Jones concisely states:
Today in the eyes of the law, any assault is both a criminal offense
and a personal tort, or wrong; any assault may be the basis for a
criminal prosecution or a civil action, or both. If you attack me in
the street, the state can put you on trial and send you to jail for
assault and battery, and I can sue you for damages. But in a great
many jurisdictions, even today, a domestic assault is not regarded as
a real assault - that is, not really criminal. When police refuse to
arrest, prosecutors to prosecute, and judges to sentence a man be-
cause the victim he assaulted is (or was) his wife or girlfriend, the
state redefines this criminal assault against a woman as a special
category of violence immune from criminal law. The state magically
transforms a crime into a noncrime. 24 5
A change in the evidentiary rule of spousal immunity cannot single-
handedly solve the problem of domestic violence. Nor will criminal
prosecution, by itself, solve the problem. However, "the fact that the
criminal justice system cannot solve a problem is not usually accepted
as a justification for lawlessness. 12 46 "The law is an important social
force - it can lead as well as follow. We cannot ignore the symbolic
value of the law. '247 The Texas Legislature took an important sym-
bolic step in enacting article 38.10. The Texas courts must now take
the next step and make this symbol meaningful in the lives of battered
women.
243. State v. Mowery, 438 N.E.2d 897, 900 (Ohio 1982).
244. Basden v. State, 897 S.W.2d 319, 321 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (en banc); Muniz
v. State, 851 S.W.2d 238, 244 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (en banc); Boykin v. State, 818
S.W.2d 782, 785 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (en banc). The Boykin court stated it would
not apply a statute literally where doing so would lead to absurd consequences. Id.
The court held this would not be an intrusion on the lawmaking powers of the legisla-
ture, but rather a demonstration of respect for the government branch, which is pre-
sumed not to enact absurd laws. Id.
245. JONES, supra note 13, at 27-28.
246. Seymore, supra note 12, at 852.
247. Id.
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